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MANIPULATION, PRIVACY, AND CHOICE
Kirsten Martin*
As individuals navigate their lives on websites and apps, their
movements, searches, and actions are silently tracked. Streams of
consumer data are then pooled by data aggregators and mined to
identify potential vulnerabilities of consumers. These potential
weaknesses, e.g., whether someone is in financial distress, having a
health crisis, or battling an addiction, are valuable to marketers and
ad networks to silently steer consumers’ market actions towards the
manipulator’s interests. While identified early on as problematic
within the economics of information broadly, the use of hypertargeting to manipulate consumers is underappreciated as a threat
to not only the autonomy of individuals but also the efficiency and
legitimacy of markets.
This Article examines targeted manipulation as the covert
leveraging of a specific target’s vulnerabilities to steer their
decisions to the manipulator’s interests. This Article positions
online targeted manipulation as undermining the core economic
assumptions of authentic choice in the market. Then, this Article
explores how important choice is to markets and economics, how
firms gained positions of power to exploit vulnerabilities and
weaknesses of individuals without the requisite safeguards in place,
and how to govern firms that are in the position to manipulate. The
power to manipulate is the power to undermine choice in the market.
As such, firms in the position to manipulate threaten the autonomy
of individuals, diminish the efficiency of transactions, and
undermine the legitimacy of markets.
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This Article argues that firms merely in the position to
manipulate, with knowledge of individual’s weaknesses and access
to their decision-making, should be regulated to ensure those firms’
interests are aligned with the target. The economic oddity is not that
firms have data that render another market actor vulnerable, but
rather the oddity is that so many firms have data to covertly
manipulate others without safeguards in place. Market actors
regularly share information about their concerns, preferences,
weaknesses, and strengths within contracts or joint ventures or
within a relationship with professional duties.
The point of manipulation is to covertly steer a target’s decision
towards the manipulator’s interests and away from the target’s; as
such, manipulation impedes a market actor’s ability to enact
preferences through choice. This undermining of choice—and not
the harming of consumers—is the basis for additional safeguards on
those in the position to manipulate. Governing targeted
manipulation online will require additional safeguards on those
firms in the position manipulate rather than attempting to identify
each instance of targeted manipulation. First, additional safeguards
are needed to limit data aggregators and ad networks—specifically,
any data trafficker without any relationship with consumers—to
ensure the use of information is in the interests of the consumer.
Second, consumer-facing websites and apps act as gatekeepers by
luring in consumers to have their data tracked by third parties and
later to be targeted with manipulative content. In so doing,
consumer-facing companies should be responsible for ensuring all
third parties that access their users—either for data collection or
for targeting content—abide by standards of care that are audited.
Where scholarship has focused on identifying instances of
manipulation to regulate, this Article argues that firms merely in the
position to manipulate, with knowledge of the individual and access
to their decision-making, should be regulated to ensure their
interests are aligned with the target.
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“One should hardly have to tell academicians that information
is a valuable resource: knowledge is power.”1
For online marketing, “data giant Acxiom provided up to 3,000
attributes on 700 million people [including purchases, net worth,
number of children, and health interests] . . . [one year later] the
number was 10,000, on 2.5 billion consumers.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
Data brokers proudly collect information on millions of
individuals with thousands of data points on each individual, or
“target.”3 These companies collect this information from, among
other sources, browsing history, shopping, location tracking, and
public records, and can use this mundane information to predict, for
example, if someone is depressed, anorexic, addicted to drugs or
alcohol, or has a medical condition.4 Ad networks and advertisers
are willing to pay top dollar to identify those in financial and
emotional difficulty to promote gambling, cures, rehab, and payday
loans, and to more effectively target vulnerable consumers
generally.5 As Professor Paul Ohm succinctly summarizes,
1

George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213
(1961).
2
Steve Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here are the data brokers quietly buying
and selling your personal information, FAST CO. (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietlybuying-and-selling-your-personal-information [https://perma.cc/P6UK-AFCB].
3
See Melendez & Pasternack, supra note 2.
4
See generally Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, What is it about
Location?, 35 BERK. TECH. L.J. 251 (2020); Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum,
Privacy Interests in Public Records: An Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 111 (2017) [hereinafter Martin & Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public
Records: An Empirical Investigation]; Kashmir Hill, Data Broker Was Selling
Lists Of Rape Victims, Alcoholics, and ‘Erectile Dysfunction Sufferer, FORBES
(Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/19/databroker-was-selling-lists-of-rape-alcoholism-and-erectile-dysfunctionsufferers/?sh=3d72b8861d53 [https://perma.cc/4LXS-54W3]; What Information
Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 113th Cong. (2013).
5
See Elisa Gabbert, The 25 Most Expensive Keywords in Google Ads,
WORDSTREAM (June 27, 2017), https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/
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“[companies] hoard this data for future, undefined uses; redistribute
it to countless third parties; and repurpose it in ways their customers
never imagined.”6
Advances in hyper-targeted marketing allow firms to generate
leads, tailor search results, place content, and develop advertising
based on a detailed picture of their target.7 This Article calls such
tactics “targeted manipulation,” which is the covert leveraging about
a specific target’s vulnerabilities to steer their decision to the
manipulator’s interest. As Professor Ryan Calo predicted in one of
the first papers on the manipulation of online consumers, hypertargeting, combined with the data collected on individuals, can
allow firms to, for example, predict moods, personality, stress
levels, health issues, etc., and potentially use that information to
undermine the decisions of consumers.8 In fact, Facebook offered
advertisers the ability to target teens who are “psychologically
vulnerable.”9 Data aggregators, data brokers, ad networks, and other
06/27/most-expensive-keywords [https://perma.cc/RK37-Y9Y9]. Examples of
keywords related to urgent problems were ranked by how much marketers were
willing to pay for them and included: “Bail bonds” at #2, “Lawyer” at #4, “Cash
services & payday loans” at #7, “Rehab” at #11, “Plumber” at #18, “Termites” at
#19, and “Pest control” at #20. Id.
6
Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2015)
(citing Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J.:
WHAT THEY KNOW SERIES (July 30, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404 [https://perma.cc/8W
EM-RZBC]).
7
As an example, companies can morph a target’s face with a model for
advertising. Such face-morphs are thought to be more trusting than a stranger;
however, initial experiments have not shown this increased trust to impact
behavior. Sonam Samat, Eyal Peer & Alessandro Acquisti, Can Digital FaceMorphs Influence Attitudes and Online Behaviors?, PROC. FOURTEENTH SYMP.
117, 117 (2018) (“Thus, self-morphs may be used online as covert forms of
targeted marketing – for instance, using consumers’ pictures from social media
streams to create self-morphs, and inserting the resulting self-morphs in
promotional campaigns targeted at those consumers.”).
8
See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995,
996 (2014). See generally TAL Z. ZARSKY, Online Privacy, Tailoring, and
Persuasion, in PRIVACY & TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 209 (2006).
9
Nitasha Tiku, Get Ready for the Next Big Privacy Backlash Against Facebook,
WIRED (May 21, 2017, 7:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/2017/05/welcomenext-phase-facebook-backlash/ [https://perma.cc/APW6-7KXS].

APR. 2022]

Manipulation, Privacy, & Choice

457

types of “data traffickers”10 can not only predict what consumers
want and how badly they need it, but can also leverage knowledge
about individuals’ vulnerabilities to steer their decisions in the
interest of the firm.11
Recent examinations of online consumer manipulation have
either defined manipulation broadly to include standard persuasion
and advertising tactics,12 or have focused on the use of human
psychology to prime market decisions across consumers (e.g.,
nudging or dark patterns).13 Folding targeted manipulation within
persuasion or nudging allows manipulation—which operates closer
to fraud or coercion in undermining choice in the market—to hide
within more innocuous or difficult-to-regulate tactics that are
deployed broadly across a group of users.
The phenomenon of interest is the ability of firms to covertly
leverage a target’s vulnerabilities to steer their decision towards the
manipulator’s interests. In doing so, this Article moves away from
broader interpretations of manipulation that are centered on
irrational decisions, nudges, and persuasion, which all render
10
Professor Lauren Scholz uses the term “data traffickers” to include
companies that traffic in consumer data behind the scenes and without the
knowledge of the consumer. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND.
L. J. 653, 664–67 (2019). This Author uses this term throughout this Article to
mean any company with individualized data without a relationship with users or
customers. These companies make their money trafficking consumer data. Id.
11
See, e.g., Calo, supra note 8, at 996; see also ZARSKY, supra note 8, at 209.
12
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV.
213, 213 (2016).
13
“Nudging” is the use of user interfaces to steer users to a preferred outcome,
while dark patterns is the use of user interfaces for the benefit of the company.
See Shmuel I. Becher & Yuval Feldman, Manipulating, Fast and Slow: The Law
of Non-Verbal Market Manipulations, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 459, 459 (2016); T.
Martin Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341, 341 (2013);
Anne Barnhill, I’d like to Teach the World to Think: Commercial Advertising and
Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 307, 307 (2016); Arvind Narayanan et al., Dark
Patterns: Past, Present, and Future, 18 QUEUE 67, 67 (2020); Ari Ezra Waldman,
Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’, 31 CURRENT OP.
PSYCH. 105, 105 (2020). See also Alessandro Acquisti et al., Nudges for Privacy
and Security: Understanding and Assisting Users’ Choices Online, 50 ACM
COMPUTING SURV. (CSUR) 1, 1 (2017) (summarizing the research on nudges
regarding privacy).
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manipulation so pervasive as to be un-governable.14 Instead, this
Article focuses on a stricter conceptualization—well known within
law, philosophy, and economics—that focuses on the hidden nature
of the tactic to exploit a specific target’s vulnerabilities in order to
hijack their decisions to the manipulator’s ends.15 Targeted
manipulation defined here has three important factors: (1) the
exploitation of an individual’s vulnerabilities; (2) the covertness of
the tactic; and, (3) the divergence of interests between the
manipulator and the target.
More specifically, this conceptualization focuses on
manipulation as undermining an individual’s ability to enact their
preferences through choice. Individuals generally seek to preserve
choice in the market, where consumer choice is meaningful and
indicative of consent to the transaction.16 Preserving choice-as-anindicator-of-consent is not only critical for autonomy and for a
robust political society, but is also a fundamental assumption in
economics and business as to the efficiency of transactions and the
legitimacy of markets.17 As such, this Article positions manipulation
as a close cousin to coercion and fraud in undermining an
individual’s choice in the market. Positioning targeted manipulation
as akin to coercion and fraud changes the conversation about
governance and brings in new parallel examples offline where
consumer choice is protected.18
Accordingly, this Article argues that firms merely in the position
to manipulate, with knowledge of individuals and access to
individuals’ decision-making, should be regulated to ensure firms’
interests are aligned with the target individual. In other areas, when
someone is in a position to manipulate an individual—in a position
to exploit the relative vulnerabilities or weaknesses of a target in
14

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 12.
See Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & and Helen Nissenbaum, Online
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 3
(2019); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 378 (1988); Eric A. Posner,
The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 267,
267 (2016).
16
See infra Part III.A.
17
See id.
18
See id.
15

APR. 2022]

Manipulation, Privacy, & Choice

459

order to usurp their decision-making—safeguards force their
interests to be aligned and punish acts that are seen as out of
alignment with the target.19 Given this odd economic situation,
where data traffickers have the knowledge and proximity of an
intimate relationship, without the governance and trust inherent to
such relationships in the market, the question becomes: How did
firms gain positions of power to exploit vulnerabilities and
weaknesses of individuals without the requisite safeguards in place?
This Article argues that this current market problem—where firms,
whose interests do not align with consumers, have the knowledge
and position to manipulate consumers—arises from the incorrect
framing of privacy as relinquished upon disclosure in economics
and law.20
Governing targeted manipulation online will require placing
responsibility on those in the position to manipulate rather than
attempting to identify each instance of targeted manipulation. This
Article advances two solutions in Part V below. First, external
auditing of data aggregators and ad networks in the position to
manipulate, with the individualized data to identify weaknesses and
vulnerabilities of consumers, would ensure that the use of
information is not used to manipulate consumers. This external
auditing would entail data integrity principles that are enforced
through auditing by third parties. Importantly, these duties do not
rely on any harm to be quantified, an established consumer
19

See infra Part III. B.
This Article does not cover the harm suffered by the individual being
surveilled in the vast collection of consumer data. Not further discussing such
harm is not meant to diminish the ethical implications of surveillance, only to
narrow the scope of the article. For example, respondents find that being
surveilled while forming preferences undermines their autonomy. See Yonat
Zwebner & Rom Y. Schrift, On My Own: The Aversion to Being Observed During
the Preference-Construction Stage, 47 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 475, 475 (2020); Julie
E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, U. CHI. L. REV. 181,
181 (2008); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Turning
Privacy inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1 (2019). Professor Neil
Richards defends intellectual privacy as the ability to develop ideas and beliefs
away from an unwanted gaze. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 389 (2008).
20
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relationship, or any enforcement by consumers. Instead, this Article
posits that data traffickers (i.e., companies that collect, store, and
process individualized data) would be subject to annual audits
similar to other industries that require public trust but are not
otherwise regulated by the market (e.g., financing in banks,
accounting in firms, environmental impact in manufacturing).21
Second, this Article argues that consumer-facing companies
should be responsible for the third parties that access their users’
information—either for the collection of data or for the targeting of
content—and ensure that these third parties abide by standards of
care and are audited. Consumer-facing websites and apps that lure
consumers, so that consumers’ data are collected and later used
against them, should be held responsible for the third parties they
invite to track and target their users. Current solutions place a duty
of care or loyalty on consumer-facing firms, which can create
pressure for these firms to then outsource bad privacy practices to
third parties.22 This Article offers a complementary solution to those
arguing for duties of loyalty and care to be imposed on consumerfacing firms by (1) extending their duties to include a responsibility
for the third parties that firms invite to track and target their users,
and (2) placing additional safeguards, like auditing, on data
traffickers that are in a position to manipulate consumers but are
outside the reach of current regulations and proposed legal solutions,
as well as outside market pressures.
This Article starts in Part II with an examination of targeted
manipulation, comparing manipulation with related concepts
ubiquitous in the market, such as nudges and price discrimination,
21

See 12 C.F.R. § 363 (2022); 15 U.S.C. § 78q; 15 U.S.C. 2607(a).
See Ian R. Kerr, The Legal Relationship Between Online Service Providers
and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419, 427–28 (2001); Jack M. Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185–86
(2016); Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and
User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2018); Neil M. Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 431, 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in
Privacy Law]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy
Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3642217 [https://perma.cc/75UK-3XKJ]) [hereinafter
Richards & Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law].
22
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as well as concepts banned in the market, such as fraud and coercion.
In Part III, this Article positions online targeted manipulation as an
economic abnormality in the market, which undermines the core
economic assumptions of authentic choice. In Part IV, this Article
explains how firms gained their positions of power and knowledge
to exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses of individuals without the
requisite safeguards in place. This Article further argues that firms
being in a position to leverage aggregated consumer data is a
symptom of the mistaken framing of privacy-as-concealment in law,
economics, and public policy. In Part V, this Article moves away
from seeking to identify and regulate unique instances of
manipulation, and instead argues that firms merely in a position to
manipulate, with the knowledge of an individual’s vulnerabilities
and access to their decision-making, should be regulated to ensure
the firm’s interests are aligned with the target.
II. MANIPULATION AND THE PHENOMENON OF INTEREST
Targeted manipulation sits within a family of tactics whereby
one actor attempts to exert influence over another. Therefore,
delineating the boundaries of these concepts is critical to understand
how and why targeted manipulation differs and is normally
regulated. Subpart A explains the phenomenon of interest. Subpart
B then outlines the necessary components of manipulation and
differentiates targeted manipulation from related concepts, such as
persuasion, nudges, fraud, and coercion. Finally, Subpart C
examines how targeted manipulation is normally treated within
economics regarding consumers and markets.
A. Phenomenon of Interest
The focus of this Article is targeted manipulation: the ability of
firms with knowledge about individuals to leverage a specific
target’s vulnerabilities in order to covertly undermine their decision
away from the interests of the consumer and towards the interests of
the firm.23 These vulnerabilities are identified through the broad
collection of data across websites, apps, and technologies and then
23

Targeted manipulation requires both the knowledge of the individual and the
closeness to the decision-making. Offline, this is usually the same actor.

462

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 3

through collecting search terms, contacts, locations, and browsing
histories.24 Such “surface data” can be used to “infer latent, far more
sensitive data about” individuals through predictive analytics.25 As
Professor Ryan Calo summarizes:
[T]he consumer is shedding information that, without her knowledge or
against her wishes, will be used to charge her as much as possible, to sell
her a product or service she does not need or needs less of, or to convince
her in a way that she would find objectionable were she aware of the
practice.26

The knowledge of individuals’ vulnerabilities can be tracked
directly—through search queries for gambling, medical symptoms,
or teenage depression, for example—or via inferences drawn from
vast surface data, almost always when the consumer is not aware.27
Firms now have access to data that can “predict mood, personality,
stress levels, gender, marital and job status, age, level of disease,
mental health issues, sleep, [and] physical movement,”28 which can
facilitate dynamic emotional targeting or psychographic targeting.29
24

See Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New
Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 79 MD. L. REV.
439, 445 (2020).
25
Id. at 439. As Ohm and Peppet note, everything can reveal everything. Paul
Ohm & Scott Peppet, What If Everything Reveals Everything?, in BIG DATA IS
NOT A MONOLITH, 45, 45 (MIT Press, 2016).
26
Calo, supra note 8, at 1030.
27
See Hirsch, supra note 24, at 441–42.
28
Shaun B. Spencer, The Problem of Online Manipulation, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV.
959, 979 (2020). For example, IBM has filed a patent for a process that “help[s]
search engines return web results based on the user’s ‘current emotional state,’”
based on indicia of mood drawn from webcam facial recognition, a scan of the
user’s heart rate, and even the “user’s brain waves.” Sidney Fussell, Alexa Wants
to Know How You’re Feeling Today, ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/alexa-emotiondetection-ai-surveillance/572884/ [https://perma.cc/49LN-RRDT].
29
See Jacquelyn Burkell & Priscilla M. Regan, Voter Preferences, Voter
Manipulation, Voter Analytics: Policy Options for Less Surveillance and More
Autonomy, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (2019). Burkell and Regan provide an
excellent example leveraging the morphing of two faces (one being the target)
into one person used in advertising. Id. at 4–5. Such tactics are used in commercial
and political advertising. See id.; Daniel Susser et al. Technology, Autonomy, and
Manipulation, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2019); Calo, supra note 8, at 997; Ira
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Targeted manipulation is fueled by both this knowledge of
individuals’ vulnerabilities and by the individualized reach of hypertargeted marketing. Ad networks and data traffickers are able to
target specific individuals and therefore leverage individualized
knowledge to undermine a consumer’s decision-making.30 In other
words, targeting a consumer based on broad demographics (such as
being a fifty-year-old male) is not as useful or specific as targeting
an individual for being someone who is generally anxious and
whose second child is heading to college in California. For example,
the 2016 United States presidential campaigns relied on very
specific ads viewed by only individuals who may have been swayed
by them and not seen by individuals who may have been able to
recognize the ads’ inaccuracies.31 Manipulation “affect[s] a person’s

S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861, 861
(2014); Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting:
Promises and Threats for Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 82, 82 (2018).
However, there may be limits as to the effectiveness at the individual level given
current abilities. See Peer et al., supra note 7, at 117.
30
The technique of hypertargeting, where an individual or small group of
similar individuals are targeted, also ensures that hypertargeting is not seen by
others who may not be susceptible to manipulation. In other words, hypertargeting
not only supports the individualization of the manipulation and the ability to
leverage specific vulnerabilities of a target against them, but also supports the
manipulation being hidden from others. For example, manipulative advertising
around the presidential election was so targeted on social network sites that no
one aside from the target was able to see the advertising. Sathvik Tantry, Making
Personalized Marketing Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/02/making-personalized-marketing-work
[https://perma.cc/3S8H-45ZL]; see also Leslie K. John, Tami Kim & Kate Barasz,
Ads That Don’t Overstep, HARV. BUS. REV. (2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/adsthat-dont-overstep [https://perma.cc/XJ33-LZF7].
31
Issie Lapowsky, How Russian Facebook Ads Divided and Targeted US
Voters Before the 2016 Election, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/russian-facebook-ads-targeted-us-voters-before2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/FDR2-RSAK]. See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTEL.,
116TH CONG., REP. ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION VOLUME 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS (2016).
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thoughts, opinions, and actions” and is designed to exploit specific
vulnerabilities of the target.32
Previous examinations have pooled together targeted
manipulation with broader attempts to steer consumers and users,
such as the use of dark patterns and nudges.33 This is not to say that
dark patterns and nudges are not important to examine, only that the
specific problems with targeted manipulation, i.e., the gathering and
use of information about individuals and the reach to undermine
specific targets’ decisions, get lost in a larger examination of
broader tactics.34 This Article remains focused on the phenomenon
of interest—targeted manipulation online—and does not examine
broader attempts to change behavior online, such as with nudges and
dark patterns. 35
32
“Internet actors, political entities, and foreign adversaries carefully study the
personality traits and vulnerabilities of Internet users and, increasingly, target
each such user with an individually tailored stream of information or
misinformation with the intent of exploiting the weaknesses of these individuals.”
Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449,
464 (2019).
33
See Acquisti et al., supra note 13; Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at
Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 81 PROC. ACM HUMANCOMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 3 (2019); Narayanan et al., supra note 13; Waldman,
supra note 13; Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges Do Not Undermine Human Agency, 38
J. CONSUMER POL’Y 207, 207 (2015). As a caveat to this statement, nudges and
dark patterns that are based on individualized vulnerabilities and target a specific
individual would be included in this analysis and would be closer to targeted
manipulation as such. For example, Professors Warberg, Acquisti, and Sicker test
the efficacy of tailoring a nudge to a specific psychometric measurement; that
type of targeting was not effective in impacting disclosure. See Logan Warberg,
Alessandro Acquisti & Douglas Sicker, Can Privacy Nudges Be Tailored to
Individuals’ Decision Making and Personality Traits?, PROC. 18TH ACM
WORKSHOP PRIV. ELEC. SOC. 175, 175 (2019).
34
This Article also does not explicitly cover the issues around gamification or
addictive designs, which are also important attempts to modify consumer behavior
broadly. See Tae Wan Kim & Kevin Werbach, More than Just a Game: Ethical
Issues in Gamification, 18 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 157, 157 (2016).
35
This assertion is picking up the first argument of Ryan Calo’s seminal article,
Digital Market Manipulation, Calo, supra note 8, which is “that the digitization
of commerce dramatically alters the capacity of firms to influence consumers at a
personal level.” Calo, supra note 8, at 999. Professor Calo goes on to also include
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B. Necessary Components of Manipulation
Targeted manipulation is defined here as leveraging the
vulnerabilities of individuals in order to covertly steer a target’s
decision towards the interests of the manipulator. Offline, threats of
manipulation are usually associated with established relationships
where the manipulator knows the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of
the target and is in a position to covertly undermine the target’s
decision. For example, a financial advisor or lawyer would know the
vulnerabilities of a client due to the intimate knowledge provided
within the relationship and could, if not against professional
obligations, use that information to steer the target’s decision
towards the advisor’s or lawyer’s interests. Similarly, a caregiver
would know the vulnerabilities of their charge (a toddler, a patient,
etc.) and would be close enough to be able to manipulate their
decisions away from the interest of the charge and towards the
interest of the caregiver.
Thus, targeted manipulation36 has three important factors: (1) the
exploitation of an individual’s vulnerabilities; (2) the covertness of
tactic; and, (3) the divergence of interests between manipulator and
target. This Article explores each below and explains why each
factor distinguishes this examination from previous work on online
manipulation.
1.

Exploitation of an Individual’s Vulnerabilities
Key to manipulation is leveraging an individual’s weaknesses or
vulnerabilities in order to subvert the target’s decision-making.
While other tactics seek to undermine decision-making in the
market (e.g., fraud, coercion, opportunism, etc.), manipulation
uniquely uses a target’s vulnerabilities as the tool to subvert
decision-making. A common example is the manipulation of
children, which is usually performed by parents and teachers, who
broader attempts to sway decisions online, such as the use of biases and nudges.
Id. at 1007–12. However, this Article will remain focused on the targeted
manipulation he first brought up. Id.
36
Targeted manipulation is defined here as leveraging the vulnerabilities of
individuals in order to covertly steer a target’s decision towards the interests of
the manipulator. The three factors correspond to the three components of the
definition.

466

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 3

take advantage of their targets’ lack of knowledge and lack of
experience. But manipulation can also be based on a firm’s relative
position of power and unique knowledge about the target.
As first identified by Professor Ryan Calo, online firms are able
to identify ego depletion of consumers—where they are vulnerable
and easily manipulated—based on detailed profiles of consumers.37
These companies collect “surface data”38 to predict if someone is
depressed, anorexic, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or has a medical
condition, and then those companies link that information to the
person’s location, what decisions the person may be making, and
where the person may go next.39 Ad networks and advertisers use
this information and are willing to pay these companies top dollar to
identify people in financial and emotional distress to promote
gambling, cures, rehab, and payday loans, for example.40
Firms, platforms, and other data aggregators are also in a
structural position of power over their users because these data
collectors retain the unique services and knowledge individuals are
seeking, and the data aggregators create an information asymmetry
by preventing their users from fully understanding how their data is

37

Calo’s focus was more general than what is examined here: the ability to
influence consumers by exploiting their tendency to act with biases or act
“irrationally.” See Calo, supra note 8, at 1010.
38
Hirsch notes that the more innocuous data individuals shed when online (e.g.,
like the purchase of furniture anti-scuff pads) can be analyzed with predictive
analytics to identify latent knowledge (“like credit card default risk”). Hirsch,
supra note 24, at 456. “[P]redictive analytics takes surface data and infers latent
information from it. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for people to know
what they are really sharing when they agree to disclose their surface data.” Id. at
442.
39
Yonat Zwebner & Rom Y. Schrift, On My Own: The Aversion to Being
Observed during the Preference-Construction Stage, 47 J. CONSUMER RES. 475,
476 (2020).
40
See Gabbert, supra note 5 (ranking the keywords related to urgent problems
in Google Ads in order from most expensive to least; examples include: “bail
bonds” ranked 2nd most expensive, “lawyer” ranked 4th most expensive, “cash
services & payday loans” ranked 7th most expensive, “rehab” ranked 11th most
expensive, “plumber” ranked 18th most expensive, “termites” ranked 19th most
expensive, and “pest control” ranked 20th most expensive).
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used and leveraged.41 Thus, individuals are in a position of
vulnerability vis-à-vis the data controller.42 While anyone can
deceive or commit fraud, manipulation requires a power or
knowledge imbalance rendering the target vulnerable to
exploitation. The target can be in a perennial vulnerable state (such
as a child with an adult); or, the target can be in a temporary
vulnerable state (such as when a client provides details to a lawyer
or therapist, or when a company provides concerns, preferences, and
forecasts to a third party).43
2.

Covertness of Tactic
Manipulation works because it is covert and hidden from the
target. In other words, the target must be unaware of the tactic being
used for manipulation to be effective. According to scholars Daniel
Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum:
[M]anipulative practices often work by targeting and exploiting our
decision-making vulnerabilities—concealing their effects, leaving us
unaware of the influence on our decision-making process—they also
challenge our capacity to reflect on and endorse our reasons for acting as
authentically on our own. Online manipulation thus harms us both by
inducing us to act toward ends not of our choosing and for reasons we
haven’t endorsed.44

This hiddenness is important because, first, it suggests an
intention to hijack a decision without regard to the target’s interests;
otherwise, more overt arguments and persuasion would be used.
Covertness in manipulation is necessary because the target would
likely never endorse the tactic if the target were aware of the
41

Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs, Privacy, and Trust: The Laudable Goals
and Ultimate Failure of Notice and Choice to Respect Privacy Online, 18 FIRST
MONDAY (Dec. 2013), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/
4838/3802 [https://perma.cc/YH3H-YXTH].
42
Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information
Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 497 (2019).
43
These concerns, preferences, and projections can be constructed from the
target’s lived experiences and are constantly evolving.
44
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 29, at 10; see also Alan Ware,
The Concept of Manipulation: Its Relation to Democracy and Power, 11 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 163, 165 (1981) (considering when A has manipulated B, “B either has
no knowledge of, or does not understand, the ways in which A affects his
choices”).
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attempted manipulation. Second, hiddenness also renders the
manipulation harder to combat, identify, and regulate. In fact,
hiddenness is so central to manipulation that Professor Ryan Calo
suggests disclosure would minimize the harm or power of
manipulation: If “manipulation subjects are informed, the potency
of manipulation may be weakened.”45 For example, imagine if the
target was told, “We are marketing this product to you because we
think you are a diabetic and particularly tired right now.” The target
would probably be outraged, insulted, and more easily able to walk
away from or counter the manipulation.
Hiddenness also differentiates manipulation from mere
persuasion.46 Persuasion engages in the marketplace of ideas by
being open and subject to counter arguments.47 Conversely, targeted
manipulation circumvents the marketplace of ideas by being hidden.
Persuasion works because the tactic is known by the target, whereas
manipulation works only if the tactic is hidden.48 In fact,
manipulation is necessary when direct, open appeals to the
preferences of the target fail.49 For instance, one can attempt to
persuade a child to put on clothes or a consumer to buy a soft drink
by openly engaging with the target using cogent (or not so cogent)
arguments. In this way, manipulation starts where persuasion
45

Kilovaty, supra note 32, at 462.
Zarsky presents an alternative view: Manipulation is just unseemly
persuasion, defined as “a process in which firms strive to motivate and influence
individuals to take specific steps and make particular decisions in a manner
considered to be socially unacceptable.” Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation
in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 158 (2019). He notes that
this is a broad issue, stating, “[s]triving to manipulate and exert influence is, of
course, not new. Quite to the contrary, almost every form of human
communication tries to do so.” Id. at 170. See also Barnhill, supra note 13, at 307
(using examples such as nudging or priming, as well as simple print advertising
and persuasion in the analysis of manipulation). By broadening the phenomenon
of interest to include persuasion (Zarsky) and nudges (Barnhill), the problematic
tactic of targeted manipulation can hide amongst the less problematic and harder
to govern tactics of nudges and persuasion.
47
One cannot counter manipulation with more speech—because manipulation
is an attempt to circumvent the marketplace of ideas by not using up front
persuasion.
48
See Barnhill, supra note 13.
49
See id.
46

APR. 2022]

Manipulation, Privacy, & Choice

469

ends—where the manipulator ceases to engage openly with the
target in a way that affords the target the ability to counter.
Conflating manipulation with persuasion makes the threat of
manipulation seem harmless and omnipresent. Professor Cass
Sunstein defines manipulation as a form of persuasion, arguing that
“the problem is that . . . manipulation can plausibly be said to be
pervasive. It can be found on television, on the Internet, in every
political campaign, in countless markets, in friendships, and in
family life.”50 Defenders of manipulation in economics, marketing,
or practice have broadened the definition to include persuasion and
advertising, thereby rendering the definition of manipulation so
broad as to include legitimate acts—effectively making the
deceptive act impossible to regulate.51
3.

Divergence of Interests Between Manipulator and Target
Finally, the goal of manipulation is to prevent targets from
pursuing their own interests and to “promote the outcome sought by
the manipulator.”52 Parents who manipulate their toddler to get
dressed before going outside are attempting to usurp the child’s
interests (to go outside naked) with their interests (to have their child
50

Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Eldar Shafir, Manipulated as a Way of Life, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 245,
245 (2016) (“Being manipulated is an integral part of the human condition. It is
unavoidable and happening all around us; yet, it has not penetrated our naive view
of the autonomy in our decisions.”); Shlomo Sher, A Framework for Assessing
Immorally Manipulative Marketing Tactics, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 97, 97 (2011)
(“[A] marketing tactic is manipulative if it is intended to motivate by undermining
what the marketer believes is his/her audience’s normal decision-making process
either by depiction or by playing on a vulnerability that the marketer believes
exists in his/her audience’s normal decision-making process.”); see VANCE
PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 1 (1957); see also JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 155–56 (1958) (noting that this is not to say
that unseemly persuasion or marketing is tasteful or even morally appropriate at
times—only that persuasion is not the phenomenon of interest for this Article).
52
Allen Wood, Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation, in MANIPULATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 31 (2014). Wood suggests that different tactics could be
seen as manipulative—even within the definition of covertly undermining a
target’s decision-making towards the manipulator’s interests—such as lying,
misleading, encouraging false assumptions, and fostering self-deception. Here,
this Article focuses on the leveraging of vulnerabilities, which could use lying but
need not.
51
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go outside with clothes on). Online, firms can leverage a consumer’s
known vulnerabilities—addiction to gambling, concern for a family
member’s depression, or a pending divorce—to shift the
individual’s decision from the individual’s current interests towards
the firms’ interests. This approach, which focuses on the divergence
of interests, leaves open the possibility that manipulation could be
within interests that align with societal norms, an ethic of care, and
respect for human dignity.53 As Professor Ido Kilovaty summarizes,
“[m]anipulation by itself is not an absolute evil. Rather, it depends
on whether there is an alignment of interests between the subject and
the manipulator, both on the individual and collective levels.”54
Detailed individualized information in the hands of a firm with
interests divergent from consumers is normally considered
dangerous. For example, Professor Roger Allan Ford, who studies
malicious actors that access consumer data to scam people, suggests
that data traffickers aid scammers in using hyper-targeted ads “to
reach the most promising victims, hide from law-enforcement
authorities,” and develop better and more effective scams by
providing scammers access to consumers’ data.55 Relatedly, both
Kilovaty and Calo analogize to data breach law in recognizing the
potential misuse of breached personal information by the actors
holding such information because their interests are not aligned with
consumers.56 Thus far, scholarship has focused on scammer and
cybersecurity threats as the malicious actors of concern.
But manipulation need not only be carried out by overtly
malicious actors that seek to break the law. As noted by Professors
Lina Khan and David Pozen, technology companies that control user
data have interests divergent from the well-being of their users.57 In
fact, the authors argue (contrary to this Article) that data controllers’

53

Such targeted manipulation is rare and within well-defined relationships.
Here, the target’s ability to act in their own interest is seen as limited. For example,
the parent/child or caregiver/charge relationships often have manipulation when
the target cannot care for themselves.
54
Kilovaty, supra note 32, at 466.
55
Roger Allan Ford, Data Scams, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 111, 111 (2019).
56
See generally Kilovaty, supra note 32; Calo, supra note 8.
57
Khan & Pozen, supra note 42, at 503.
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interests are in perpetual conflict with their users.58 According to
Khan and Pozen, data brokers, data traffickers, ad networks, and
data controllers are all similarly situated with interests that are, at
best, not aligned with consumers and are, at worst, perpetually
divergent from consumers’ interests.59 This Article need not adopt
Khan and Pozen’s idea of perpetual conflicts of interest to
acknowledge that data traffickers can have interests that diverge
from consumers and that few market forces exist to align these
interests.60
The phenomenon of interest herein focuses on interests
diverging between the manipulator and the target and differs from
two alternative definitions of manipulation that focus on either (a)
58
“Even if one accepts, for argument’s sake, the soundness of the predatory/
nonpredatory distinction in this context—although this soundness doubtful—it is
unclear how a digital fiduciary is supposed to fulfill its duty of loyalty to users,
even under conditions of profound and ‘perpetual’ conflict.” Id. at 513. Khan and
Pozen’s argument shows the danger in using maximizing shareholder wealth as
an operating mission statement in running a company. See Lynn Stout and
Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar for the standard argument against relying on
“shareholder wealth maximization” as necessary, useful, or helpful. See R.
Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective
Revisited,” 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 364 (2004); LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 10–12 (2012).
59
Empirical studies support the idea that data aggregators and hackers have
similarly divergent interests from consumers: Consumers distrust firms that have
been hacked and also distrust firms that sell their information to a data aggregator
to the same degree. Kirsten Martin, Breaking the Privacy Paradox, 30 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 65, 65 (2020). As Professor Ryan Calo aptly suggests, legal
intervention is justified whenever there is a divergence between these interests,
leading to one side leveraging this gap in information to her own benefit. Calo,
supra note 8, at 1023.
60
As this Author has noted previously, data aggregators and the “Big Data”
industry are in a similar position to the banks with credit default swaps in 2008:
Neither have any natural market forces to ensure that the interests of the people
impacted (users, citizens) are considered. Data aggregators are free to collect any
information and will pay top dollar for even the lowest quality information and
with the least privacy expectations respected. Similarly, banks in 2008 were free
to collect mortgages of low quality and with little to no requirements respected.
Both are able to make money while others take on the risks. Kirsten Martin, Data
Aggregators, Consumer Data, and Responsibility Online: Who is Tracking
Consumers Online and Should They Stop?, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 51, 51 (2016).
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the “rationality” of the target’s decision or (b) the inappropriateness
of the target’s decision. This first definition of manipulation, a
broader approach, focuses on the degree that the target’s decision is
deemed “rational,” wherein manipulators are those that circumvent
a target’s rational decision-making process.61 Someone is said to
have been manipulated if their decision is judged as not rational
enough. For example, behavioral economist Cass Sunstein judges a
decision as being manipulated “if it does not sufficiently engage or
appeal to people’s capacity for reflective and deliberate choice.”62
However, defining manipulation solely as that which
undermines “rationality” is problematic. First, only a small group of
people63 actually make decisions in a manner that is consistent with
61

See Shaun B. Spencer, The Problem of Online Manipulation, 2020 U. ILL. L.
REV. 959, 963 (2020); Julia Hanson et al., Taking Data Out of Context to HyperPersonalize Ads: Crowdworkers’ Privacy Perceptions and Decisions to Disclose
Private Information, CHI 2020 Paper 1, 2 (2020); Kilovaty, supra note 32, at 457.
62
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 213. For example, Anne Barnhill includes
decision-making that fall short of ideals for “belief, desire, or emotion.” She
focuses on deliberative versus using heuristics, and that is tied to not acting
rationally or to advance their own self-interest. Barnhill, supra note 13, at 72. Or,
to engage with intuitive thinking or non-verbal. Becher & Feldman, supra note
13, at 2. Or, to even just attempt to influence someone’s decision-making.
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008). See also Moti Gorin, Do
Manipulators Always Threaten Rationality?, 51 AM. PHIL. Q. 51, 51 (2014). And,
“human choice is assumed to be made by a mentally competent, fully informed
individual, through a process of rational self-deliberation.” Michal S. Gal,
Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 59, 75–
76 (2018) (citing Isaiah Berlin). “Manipulation, broadly conceived, can perhaps
be understood as intentionally causing or encouraging people to make the
decisions one wants them to make by actively promoting their making the
decisions in ways that rational persons would not want to make their decisions.”
THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 33 (1991); see also T. M.
Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341, 345 (2013).
63
Autistic respondents, it turns out, might be more “rational” decision makers
than non-autistic adults, who tend to behave more “intuitively” in their decisionmaking. See Mark Brosnan et al., Reasoning on the Autism Spectrum: A Dual
Process Theory Account, 46 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 2115, 2121 (2016);
see also Benedetto De Martino et al., Explaining Enhanced Logical Consistency
During Decision Making in Autism, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10746, 10750 (2008)
(finding that autistic individuals were “better able to ignore biasing contextual
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what researchers call “rational,” thereby leaving the majority of
people to continually act in ways deemed “irrational,” and thus
making the designation do little work in differentiating types of
decisions.64 In other words, under this definition, all decisions can
be seen as not fully rational. Therefore, if all decisions are not
entirely rational, all decisions are possibly manipulated, making
manipulation almost impossible to meaningfully identify.65 Because
non-rational decisions are ubiquitous, equating manipulation with
non-rational decisions allows scholars to declare that manipulation
is everywhere.66 However, the phenomenon of interest examined in
this Article is the tactic of covertly undermining a target’s decision

information and isolate the critical information”); see also George D. Farmer et
al., People with Autism Spectrum Conditions Make More Consistent Decisions,
28 PSYCH. SCI. 1067, 1073 (2017) (“People with autism spectrum conditions
made . . . more conventionally rational decisions.”). Rational decisions also
remove adaptations that have proven to be evolutionarily desirable, such as group
survival and altruistic fairness. See Nicolas Baumard et al., A Mutualistic
Approach to Morality: The Evolution of Fairness by Partner Choice, 36 BEHAV.
& BRAIN SCIS. 59, 81 (2013); see also Sule Guney & Ben Newell, Fairness
Overrides Reputation: The Importance of Fairness Considerations in Altruistic
Cooperation, 7 FRONTIERS IN HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 2 (2013) (“[T]he
Responders seem to engage in actions that are opposite to their self-interest, in
order to maintain the fairness norms between parties. Thus, fairness
considerations seem to override the self-regarding/rational motives.”); see also
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 159, 161 (2000) (“[P]ositive reciprocity is
deeply embedded in many social interactions.”). The use of “rational” has
mistakenly become shorthand for a desirable decision; however, it is no longer
clear that rational decisions are desirable and that irrational decisions are not
desirable.
64
See Brosnan, supra note 63, at 2121.
65
One reason “rationality” is put forth as a test to determine if someone is
manipulated is to maintain the perspective that a “good” decision is not
manipulated and a “bad” decision is manipulated—and “rationality” is a go-to
(but mistaken) shorthand for “good” decisions. Scholars do this because society
thinks manipulation is morally problematic and therefore morally nonproblematic things (like using rational decision-making) should not be included.
“[I]t may be assumed that forms of interpersonal influence that are generally taken
to be morally benign or even exemplary—for example, rational persuasion—
cannot be used manipulatively.” Gorin, supra note 62, at 51.
66
See Shafir, supra note 51, at 255.
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towards the interests of the manipulator.67 Thus, this Article does not
focus on whether the target’s decision-making is deemed rational or
not.68
Alternatively, a narrower definition of manipulation requires
that the end-goal of the manipulator be undesirable. For example,
Professor Tal Zarsky uses the standard of what is socially
unacceptable, where manipulation is “a process in which firms strive
to motivate and influence individuals to take specific steps and make
particular decisions in a manner considered to be socially
unacceptable.”69 Similarly, Professor Robert Noggle offers a
frequently-used definition of manipulation that rests on the intention
of the manipulator to move a target’s decision in such a way that
even the manipulator would not approve of the decision; scholars
Christian Coons and Michael Weber describe Noggle’s viewpoint
as follows: “[M]anipulation is influence that attempts to get the
target to stray from [the influencer’s] ideals or rational standards for
belief, desire, and emotion.”70 Noggle’s version of manipulation
“involves influencing in ways the influencers could not themselves
67
However, making rationality the standard for non-manipulation is also used
to judge the tactic of nudges, dark patterns, adaptive choice architectures, and
invisible influence in general. See Becher & Feldman, supra note 13, at 459; see
also Wilkinson, supra note 62, at 341 (explaining nudges as a subtle method of
influencing human behavior); Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1; Daniel
Susser, Invisible Influence: Artificial Intelligence and the Ethics of Adaptive
Choice Architectures, PROC. 2019 AAAI/ACM CONF. AI, ETHICS & SOC. 1, 1
(2019). See also Arnuesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a
Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS
81:1, 1 (2019) (examining dark patterns and recommending policies to mitigate
potential harm to consumers).
68
Professor Ryan Calo takes a similar approach in his seminal work where he
focuses on the ability of firms to exploit consumers’ general tendency to act
irrationally. Calo, supra note 8, at 1032–33.
69
Zarsky, supra note 46, at 158. For Professor Zarsky, manipulation is based
on a standard of rational decision-making, which is desirable: “Entities collecting
vast personal information about individuals will use insights they have learned to
influence individuals in ways we consider to be unfair and thus unacceptable, and
therefore must be stopped.” Id. at 168–69.
70
Christian Coons & Michael Weber, Manipulation: Investigating the Core
Concept and Its Moral Status, MANIPULATION: THEORY & PRAC. 1, 11 (2014);
see also Robert Noggle, Manipulative Actions: A Conceptual and Moral Analysis,
33 AM. PHIL. Q. 43, 45 (1996) (outlining the various types of manipulation).
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accept.”71 Moreover, according to Noggle, an act is not manipulative
if the manipulator (or influencer) “is sincere, that is, in accordance
with what the influencer takes to be true, relevant, and
appropriate.”72
This approach creates a standard of manipulation that is almost
never met; according to this paternalistic view of manipulation,
manipulators frequently believe their end-goal or interests are
aligned with their target. And, sometimes manipulators with this
perspective do act in the best interest of the target, such as when
parents manipulate their children to put on clothes in the winter or
when caregivers manipulate a disabled patient to take their medicine
or take a shower. Here, these manipulators are in a position of
caregiving with the expectation that their interests will trump the
preferences of their charge—a charge who is deemed to need help
and unable to make decisions for themselves. More importantly,
relying on manipulators themselves to admit that their interests for
a target are inappropriate leaves a glaring hole for manipulators to
claim they are acting in the best interests of their targets. In fact,
marketers likewise frequently defend their tactics as being in the
best interest of consumers.73
71

Coons & Weber, supra note 70, at 14.
Noggle, supra note 70, at 50.
73
For example, an industry trade group, called the Network Advertising
Initiative, contends that targeted advertising provides consumer services and
content for free, thereby helping the economy. Understanding Digital
Advertising, NAI, https://www.networkadvertising.org/understanding-onlineadvertising/ [https://perma.cc/DR77-XKHA] (last visited Dec. 20, 2021). In
reaction to a Wall Street Journal article on how targeted advertising benefits ad
networks and data traffickers but not consumers or publishers doing the
advertising, a chief marketing office (“CMO”) claimed that, “[a]s most consumers
know, advertising relevant to their interests gives them a better experience online.
For marketers it’s an efficient way to reach their customers.” David Doty, A
Reality Check on Advertising Relevancy and Personalization, FORBES (Aug. 13,
2019, 12:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddoty/2019/08/13/a-realitycheck-on-advertising-relevancy-and-personalization/#7765e9397690
[https://perma.cc/T4TF-7MGK]. The CMO was reacting to a study analyzing who
benefits from hyper-targeted advertising that stated, “when advertisers can highly
personalize ads, they are . . . reaching narrower consumers’ segments where the
competition may be drastically reduced . . . potentially leading to a reduction in
72
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Manipulation’s “wrongness” is not necessarily because the end
goal is bad, irrational, or socially undesirable, but is instead because
manipulation undermines the targets as the authors of their own
decisions, and attempts to steer those decisions towards the
manipulator’s interests.74 Manipulation here is agnostic to the
decision-making process or interests of the target. The target may or
may not be self-interested, a slow deliberator, immune to sensory
signals, or online. Regardless, the manipulator wants to hijack the
target’s decision towards the manipulator’s own preferences and
goals—which diverge from the target’s—in a way that covertly
leverages the target’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities. It is the
divergence of these interests that makes targeted manipulation
particularly important for law and economics.
C. Manipulation in Economics
Targeted manipulation, as in, the leveraging of individualized
knowledge to exploit a target’s vulnerabilities to covertly undermine
their decision-making, has been identified as theoretically possible,
but unlikely, by two overlapping fields in economics: (1) advertising
and (2) price discrimination.
First, the economics of advertising examines the costs and
benefits of advertising and marketing tactics.75 A subset of
scholarship has focused on the economics of information in product
promotion, as with hyper-targeted advertising, to include the use of
psychographic profiling.76 Hyper-targeted advertising is framed as
efficient so that “advertising is only shown and designed for a select

the publisher’s revenue.” Veronica Marotta, et al., Online Tracking and
Publishers’ Revenues: An Empirical Analysis (May 2019) (preliminary draft).
74
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 15, at 17; see also Wood, supra
note 52, at 17–18 (“[W]hen getting others to do what you want is morally
problematic, this is not so much because you are making them worse off (less
happy, less satisfied) but, instead, it is nearly always because you are messing
with their freedom—whether by taking it away, limiting it, usurping it, or
subverting it.”).
75
See generally THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING (Kyle Bagwell ed., 2001)
(presenting influential scholarship on the economics of advertising).
76
See Burkell & Regan, supra note 29, at 1.
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group of consumers who stand to gain most from this information.”77
As noted by Professor Catherine Tucker, “at first glance[,] the fact
that new digital technologies are enabling more informative
advertising would appear to indirectly increase a consumer’s
potential utility.”78 Better information in the hands of marketers is
assumed to benefit advertisers by increasing efficiency and to
benefit consumers by showing only relevant ads.79 A key assumption
in the economics of advertising is that data collectors or data
traffickers—those who gather and use the consumer data for
advertising—are actors with interests aligned with the target, and
this apparent alignment is why these scholars may assume that the
use of information is a benefit to consumers.
However, the economics of advertising, including product
placement and promotion, struggles with incorporating the
preferences of the consumer in the analysis when it comes to privacy
77

Catherine E. Tucker, The Economics of Advertising and Privacy, 30 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 326, 326 (2012) (“[A]n advertiser might track whether someone
visits a website that deals with new babies’ health issues and then use that
information to serve them ads. Alternatively, an advertiser could use information
that a person has posted about themselves on a social networking website such as
Facebook to identify new mothers.”); see also Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker,
Digital Economics, 57 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 3 (2019); David S. Evans, The
Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 37, 56 (2009) (“These detailed data on browsing enable providers of
online advertising to provide higher-quality prospects to advertisers and to
therefore charge more for the advertising inventory they supply.”).
78
Tucker, supra note 77, at 326.
79
Goldfarb and Tucker show that the evidence is mixed in terms of targeted
advertising. While Goldfarb and Tucker’s 2011 article (Avi Goldfarb & Catherine
E. Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising, 57 MGMT. SCI. 57 (2011))
is frequently cited to establish that privacy regulations could limit the ability of
firms to tailor advertising to a consumer’s behavior and may reduce online
advertising effectiveness, their more recent work is less cited, which found that
dynamic retargeted ads are, on average, less effective than their generic
equivalent. Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Display Advertising:
Targeting and Obtrusiveness, 30 MKTG. SCI. 389, 389 (2011); see also Tal Z.
Zarsky, Online Privacy, Tailoring, and Persuasion, in PRIVACY AND
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 209, 209–24 (2006); Avi Goldfarb & Catherine
Tucker, Why Managing Consumer Privacy Can Be an Opportunity, MITSLOAN
(Mar. 19, 2013) https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-managing-consumerprivacy-can-be-an-opportunity/ [https://perma.cc/3GDQ-NLZ2].
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expectations, trust, and overall unease with advertising and the
required data-tracking.80 Professor Catherine Tucker has specifically
identified the issue of the intrusiveness of data collection as:
“[C]onsumers may be wary of being tracked too closely by firms
and then firms using this information to tailor prices”—a concern
also identified by Professors Alessandro Acquisti and Hal Varian.81
Scholars studying the economics of information and advertising
have identified this problematic tracking tactic—wherein firms gain
access to intimate consumer information and use that information to
covertly influence consumer decisions—but have yet to sufficiently
engage with what the prevalence of manipulation means for the
current advertising industry.
Second, the economics of price discrimination analyzes when
firms differentiate prices across various populations of customers.
Pricing can be based on coupons, group identification, volume of

80
“There is no clear economic literature that helps factor such [consumer]
distaste into the standard utility model.” Tucker, supra note 77, at 327; Evans,
supra note 77, at 56; see Qiaowei Shen & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Behavior-Based
Advertising, 64 MGMT. SCI. 2047, 2047 (2018); see also Alessandro Acquisti,
Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 442, 442 (2016). As noted by Goldfarb and Tucker, “[i]n general the
economics literature on privacy, both offline and online, grapples with the
question of how privacy should be treated in terms of the consumers’ utility
function.” Goldfarb & Tucker, supra note 77, at 22. Consumers may resist having
advertising platforms collect detailed information about their browsing behavior.
See Evans, supra note 77, at 52. Seen as a cost, consumer annoyance results from
sending advertising messages to consumers based on their past purchase behavior.
See Shen & Villas-Boas, supra note 80, at 2047. Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman
note that “national surveys have consistently found widespread evidence of
significant privacy concerns among internet users. From the standpoint of selfinterested individual behavior, the economic motive behind concerns for privacy
is far from irrational. It is nearly self-evident. If it is true that information is power,
then control over personal information can affect the balance of economic power
among parties.” Acquisti, Taylor & Wagman, supra note 80, at 445.
81
Tucker, supra note 77, at 326. This concern was also identified in a similar
article by Professors Alessandro Acquisti and Hal Varian. See Alessandro
Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase History, 24 MKTG.
SCI. 367, 367 (2005).
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product, and other methods.82 Personalized pricing (also referred to
as first-degree price discrimination, customized pricing, or targeted
pricing), represents a pricing strategy “whereby firms charge
different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to
pay.”83 As noted in a symposium on the economics of price
discrimination, “[W]e are approaching a world in which each
consumer will be charged a personalized price for a personalized
product or service.”84 For example, Professors Peter Seele, Claus
Dierksmeier, Reto Hofstetter, and Mario Schultz have advanced a
classic example of the choice to sell Coca-Cola, not based on a
location or even the location’s temperature, but based on a
consumer’s willingness to pay.85 Given the evolution of online
marketing, a concern is that firms might offer, for example, CocaCola based on whether someone is diabetic, addicted to sugar, or,
perhaps, at a low emotional point. Building on consumer data,
pricing algorithms can estimate consumers’ willingness to pay, or,
82

Curtis R. Taylor, Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer
Information, RAND J. ECON., 631, 640 (2004); Gerhard Wagner & Horst
Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and
Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions, 86
U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 581 (2019). Third-degree price discrimination consists of
offering different pricing for different groups of people based on observable
characteristics—perhaps coupons of versioning. Goldfarb & Tucker, supra note
77. Second-degree price discrimination is the offering of different pricing and
allowing consumers to choose the pricing that suits them (volume pricing). Id.
First degree price discrimination includes personalized pricing. Id. In addition,
pricing in general can include what product is offered and at what price to each
consumer or group of consumers. Id.
83
See Vidyanand Choudhary et al., Personalized Pricing and Quality
Differentiation, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1120, 1120 (2005); see also Paul Heidhues &
Botond Kőszegi, Naïveté-Based Discrimination, 132 Q. J. ECON. 1019, 1019
(2017); Acquisti & Varian, supra note 81, at 367; Hal Varian, Artificial
Intelligence, Economics, and Industrial Organization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 24839 2018).
84
Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is a
Function of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 217
(2019). It should be noted that not all find personalized pricing to be realistic—
perhaps because the current incarnation of personalized pricing is so problematic,
as examined here. See Varian, supra note 83.
85
Peter Seele et al., Mapping the Ethicality of Algorithmic Pricing: A Review
of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing, 170 J. BUS. ETHICS 697, 697 (2019).
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as Professors Zubin Xu and Anthony Dukes state, algorithms can
gain “superior knowledge” by understanding consumer preferences
better than the consumers themselves.86
In one of the first examinations of personalized pricing, Acquisti
and Varian analyzed conditioning prices on consumers’ purchase
history.87 At the time, the personalized pricing analysis assumed
consumers (1) knew the firms conducting the price discrimination
and (2) were emboldened to take their business elsewhere if the price
discrimination was unwanted.88 Further, it was assumed that the
price discrimination would make the pricing more accurate and
efficient and, therefore, beneficial to consumers (or they would
otherwise leave the transaction).89
However, these assumptions no longer hold given the current
capabilities in online marketing. First, firms seeking to price
discriminate are unknown to consumers, rendering consumers
unable to take any market action to stop the collection of information
necessary to engage in the problematic price discrimination (or
targeted manipulation in this Article’s parlance). For example, in
their analysis of price discrimination, authors Professors Peter Seele,
Claus Dierksmeier, Reto Hofstetter, and Mario Schultz note that
“[w]hat remains invisible for the eye of most consumers, is the fact
that their online behavior creates a long data trace consisting of

86
Zibin Xu & Anthony Dukes, Product Line Design Under Preference
Uncertainty Using Aggregate Consumer Data, 38 MKTG. SCI. 669, 669 (2019).
87
Acquisti & Varian, supra note 81, at 367.
88
Id. (“Although sellers can now easily use price-conditioning strategies,
consumers are far from defenseless. No one is forced to join a loyalty program. It
is relatively easy to set one’s browser to reject cookies or to erase them after a
session is over. Consumers can use a variety of credit cards or more exotic
anonymous payment technologies to make purchases anonymous or difficult to
trace. In addition, consumers can voice their displeasure for pricing policies
perceived as discriminatory or intrusive . . . .”).
89
For example, assume that “even though sellers can post prices, observe
choices, and condition subsequent price offers on observed behavior, buyers are
also able to hide the fact that they bought previously. Hence, it is likely that sellers
will have to offer buyers some benefits to induce them to reveal their identities.”
Id. at 368.
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personal characteristics, such as location data, browsing and
purchasing history, social media posts and ‘likes,’ and so on.”90
Second, consumers cannot be considered emboldened.91 As
noted more recently by Professors Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis
Taylor, and Liad Wagman:
Personal data is continuously bought, sold, and traded among firms
(from credit-reporting agencies to advertising companies to so-called
‘infomediaries,’ which buy, sell, and trade personal data), but consumers
. . . do not have access to those markets: they cannot yet efficiently buy
back their data, or offer their data for sale.92

Finally, current online digital marketing and pricing techniques
are not necessarily more accurate or efficient for the consumer.
Recent scholarship on the economics of personalized pricing has
raised concerns over manufacturing preferences and artificially
shifting consumption patterns.93 “When price discrimination targets
misperceptions, specifically demand-inflating misperceptions,”
price discrimination may hurt consumers and may reduce
efficiency.94 The economics of price discrimination has (until
recently) been able to hold constant consumer preferences or has
assumed that hyper-targeting and personalized pricing is beneficial,
therefore making the type of targeted consumer manipulation, that
is the subject of this Article, not a concern.95
90

Seele et al., supra note 85, at 705.
Aquisti, Taylor & Wagman, supra note 80, at 447; see David Streitfeld, On the
Web, Price Tags Blur, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2000) https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/2000/09/27/on-the-web-price-tags-blur/14daea51-3a64-488f-8e6b-c1
a3654773da/ [https://perma.cc/8WAM-T2FX].
92
Acquisti, Taylor & Wagman, supra note 80, at 447.
93
“When the seller ‘manufactured’ the preferences of the buyer, it is no longer
clear that a contract of sale, entered into voluntarily, maximizes the welfare of
both parties. The function of the bargained-for contract, to ensure optimal
satisfaction of preferences for both sides, becomes moot. And with it, the concept
of social welfare, understood as the aggregate of individual well-being, becomes
illusory.” Wagner & Eidenmuller, supra note 82, at 602.
94
In this situation, for economists, the “actual” demand curve is supplemented
by the perceived demand curve—where consumers are manipulated into believing
they have a demand. Bar-Gill, supra note 84, at 217.
95
Justin P. Johnson notes that the cost of losing the trust of consumers is not
included at all in the calculation to use manipulative tactics in marketing, such as
91
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In sum, both the economics of advertising and the economics of
price discrimination have identified the often assumed-away
scenario of using intimate knowledge to covertly manipulate a
consumer through advertising, product placement, or pricing.
Professors Gerhard Wagner and Horst Eidenmuller nicely
summarized this conclusion in a recent analysis of the economics of
personalized pricing: “In traditional markets, sellers do not know the
‘weak spots’ of an individual customer and thus are unable to turn
them into ‘sweet spots’ for themselves.”96 The possibility of a firm
gaining a position of power to manipulate consumers—with
intimate knowledge of consumers, as well as the reach to covertly
target their decision-making—has always been a possibility in
economics but was considered highly unlikely with empowered and
knowledgeable consumers.97 More recent work in economics has
begun to grapple with the reality consumers face—where firms are
now in the position to manipulate millions online without any
governance or safeguards in place.98
III. MANIPULATION AND CONSUMER CHOICE
Online firms are now in the position to manipulate consumers
with data about individuals’ weaknesses to covertly influence the
decisions of targets. This scenario was predicted as possible, even
worrisome, by economists but unlikely due to presumed structural

psychometric profiling and hyper-targeted advertising. Justin P. Johnson,
Targeted Advertising and Advertising Avoidance, 44 RAND J. ECON. 128, 128
(2013). Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, and Marco Ottaviani provide a helpful
example of never taking into consideration the desires of the object of
information: “We derive positive and normative implications depending on the
extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders
collecting personalized data, and whether firms are able to personalize prices.”
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, Persuasion Through
Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy
Regulation, 66 MGMT. SCI. 4958, 4958 (2020).
96
Wagner & Eidenmuller, supra note 82, at 607.
97
Stigler, supra note 1, at 213.
98
The next Part covers this idea. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte
& George Loewenstein, Secrets and Likes: The Drive for Privacy and the Difficulty
of Achieving It in the Digital Age, 30 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 736 (2020).
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and market barriers.99 Economists previously assumed that intimate
information would remain only in the hands of those whose interests
aligned with the individual and where consumers would know the
firm that used their information for promotion, placement, or
pricing.100 In other words, the underlying assumption was that
consumers would always be enabled to prevent their information
from falling into the hands of firms capable of manipulating them.101
This assumption is normally very reasonable; offline market actors
do not disclose information about preferences, concerns, forecasts,
or other data without safeguards in place to protect against possible
manipulation.102
Importantly, firms are in the position to manipulate consumers,
thereby undermining an individual consumer’s ability to enact their
preferences through choice. A defining feature of this tactic is to
steer the target’s decision away from their interests and towards the
manipulator’s interests; currently, data-trafficking firms are in a
position to manipulate consumers across markets—when shopping
online, when looking for a doctor, when researching universities,
when pricing a loan, etc.
Next, this Article examines the danger of targeted manipulation
in undermining consumer choice in the market. Society generally
seeks to preserve consumer choice, where choice is meaningful and
indicative of consent to a transaction. Choice-as-consent is
important across markets, not only to preserve the individual as the
author of their own decision,103 but also to ensure the preferences of
the individual are enacted in their decisions, and that those
transactions and the market are efficient and legitimate.104 In fact, as
this Article explores in more detail below, authentic consent is
critical to markets and economics. This Article positions targeted
online manipulation—the covert leveraging of vulnerabilities to
99

See supra Part II.C.; infra Part IV.A.
See supra Part II.C.
101
See supra Part II.C.
102
See infra Part III.C.
103
See Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 15, at 17.
104
See Friedrich August Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 42–44 (1960); Zarsky, supra note 46, at 168.
100
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undermine a target’s decision-making—as a close cousin to fraud
and coercion in undermining consumer choice.
A. Choice-as-Consent
Before agreements and contracts and before transaction costs
and safeguards, lies an assumption that individual choice is
meaningful and exemplifies the operationalization of a market
actor’s preferences. A choice to agree or transact in the market is
unburdened by coercion, fraud, and government intervention.
Words like “free” and “voluntary private bargaining” are frequently
used to explain market actors and transactions.105 In deciding to
transact, individuals search and gather information as to the terms,
bargain over those terms, and then make a decision based on their
knowledge of their preferences, needs, and information.106 That
choice is the consumer’s enactment of preferences, or as close as
one can get to such an enactment. The principle is that one protects
the voluntary character of an exchange and seeks to identify actions
that could undermine choice-as-consent.107
Choice-as-consent is the air that the modern economist breathes:
“[B]y choosing, individuals reveal that they agree with or consent to

105

As noted by Milton Friedman, economic exchanges are market exchanges
if “individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular
exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary.” MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 14 (1962). Hayek, supra note 104, at 524 (“If we can
agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to
changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow
that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these
circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources
immediately available to meet them.”); see also Gordon R. Foxall, The Behavior
Analysis of Consumer Choice: An Introduction to the Special Issue, J. ECON.
PSYCH. 581–82 (2003). Coase defends choice as better than any interference.
Coase, supra note 104, at 1. Arrow starts his argument with a “chooser” for social
choice and likens voting to market choice. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the
Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328, 331 (1950).
106
See Coase, supra note 104, at 114; see generally R. H. COASE, THE FIRM,
THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988).
107
See 3 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 49 (Ann
Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press, 1962).
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the conditions under which the choice is made.”108 The argument
behind the exaltations of choice-as-consent is that each individual is
best able to identify, weigh, argue, and act in their best interest. For
example, when choosing a mortgage lender, the individual
determines which factors (e.g., timelines, rate, responsiveness, etc.)
are important to them—their choice reflects their preferences.
Choice-as-consent critically allows individuals to retain autonomy
and choose since “individuals know better than anyone else what is
best for them.”109
In undermining an individual’s choice in the market,
manipulation closely mirrors coercion and fraud. Philosopher
Joseph Raz links manipulation to coercion where both tactics
“subject the will of one person to that of another,” which violates
their “independence and is inconsistent with [their] autonomy.”110
Where coercion subverts the choice of the target by physically
taking away options, manipulation subverts the choice of the target
by perverting how individuals make decisions and form
preferences.111 Where the target must be aware of coercion for it to
work, manipulation only works if hidden from the target. The
manipulator, by distorting the reality of the target’s situation, must
have the individual believe that they made their own decision.112
Table 1 below summarizes how manipulation, fraud, coercion, and
persuasion work to undermine consumer choice and highlights how

108
Alain Marciano, Freedom, Choice and Consent. A Note on a Libertarian
Paternalist Dilemma, 32 HOMO OECONOMICUS 287, 288 (2015).
109
Gal, supra note 62, at 76. In doing so, individuals are able to choose based
on their preferences, as formed within their lived experience. Id.
110
RAZ, supra note 15, at 378. Raz states that autonomy is part of a social ideal
and is opposed to a life of coerced choices. Id.
111
Id. at 377–78. As noted by Wilkinson, “manipulation involves the perversion
of a decision-making process. Whereas coercion uses threats, which involve
changing the costs of selecting certain options, manipulation involves some
underhand interference with the ways in which people see their options.”
Wilkinson, supra note 62, at 345. For Raz, manipulation “perverts the way [a]
person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals.” RAZ, supra note 15,
at 377–78.
112
Konstantinos Kalliris, Self-Authorship, Well-Being and Paternalism, 8
JURIS. 23, 30 (2017).

486

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 3

targeted manipulation aligns more closely with coercion and fraud
than with persuasion as a tactic to “influence” decision-making.
Table 1. Comparing Tactics that Undermine Consumer Choice
Factors of
Manipulation

Consumer Choice Targeting Tactics
Manipulation

Coercion

Fraud

Persuasion

Goal to Subvert
Target’s
Interests

Y

Y

Y

N

Hidden

Y

N

Y

N

Undermine
Decisionmaking

Y

Y

Y

N

Exploit
Vulnerability

Y

Y

N

N

* Y = yes; N = no
Professor Eric Posner perhaps best links manipulation to choice:
Manipulation “causes a person to act against his own interest, and
for the interest of someone else, in a setting where the victim cannot
easily protect himself by relying on common sense or ordinary
willpower.”113 Alternatively, Professor Martin Wilkinson posits that
manipulation “is intentionally and successfully influencing
someone using methods that pervert choice.”114
B. Why Society Protects Choice
Manipulation is in a family of tactics that undermines consumer
choice in the market—tactics which are the subject of regulations
and safeguards.115 One protects choice for three reasons: (1) the

113

Posner, supra note 15, at 6.
Wilkinson, supra note 62, at 347.
115
This family of tactics includes fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, undue
influence, and others.
114
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autonomy of the individual; (2) the efficiency of individual
transactions; and, (3) the legitimacy of the market.
1.

Autonomy
As philosopher Raz summarizes, “[t]he ideal of personal
autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their
own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout
their lives.”116 Autonomy is critical for individuals to “have unique
access to their situations, their constraints, and their tastes.”117 This
drive for autonomy is the same drive for liberty and provides the
grounding for our political, social, and economic lives.118 As noted
by philosopher Isaiah Berlin:
[T]he word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual
to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself,
not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of
my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an
object to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my
own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to
be . . . a doer—deciding, not being decided for . . . .119

Autonomy is an end worth protecting, not because maintaining
autonomy necessarily optimizes decisions or serves some larger
good, but because maintaining autonomy allows an individual to be
the author of her own decisions.120 Someone who is autonomous can
evaluate options, assess plans, and decide what is best.121 As Dr.
Konstantinos Kalliris summarizes, “[c]oercion and manipulation
undermine autonomy because they interfere with this decisionmaking process.”122 If individuals are manipulated, “they are
deprived of the (full) ability to make choices on their own, simply
because they are not given a fair or adequate chance to weigh all
variables.”123 Manipulation disrupts a target’s capacity for self116

RAZ, supra note 15, at 369 n.5.
Sunstein, supra note 33, at 228.
118
Burkell & Regan, supra note 29, at 1; Amartya Sen, Liberty and Social
Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 5, 5 (1983); AMARTYA SEN, Individual Preference as the Basis
of Social Choice, in SOCIAL CHOICE RE-EXAMINED 15, 15 (Springer, 1997).
119
ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 22 (1958).
120
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 15.
121
Kalliris, supra note 112, at 8.
122
Id.
123
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 228.
117
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authorship by allowing another to decide how and why the target
ought to live.124 Manipulation’s challenge to individual autonomy as
self-authorship is “its deeper, more insidious harm.”125
2.

Efficiency
For economists, efficiency is the ultimate rationale for favoring
authentic choice and is why economic theory relies on choice.126 Not
allowing consumers to make their own choices based on their
preferences and in pursuit of their own interests is considered
inefficient and leads to suboptimal transactions.127 The individual “is
the person most interested in his own well-being” and the “ordinary
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing
those that can be possessed by anyone else.”128 Essentially, the
124

Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 29, at 8 (“Making one’s own
life means freely facing both existential choices, like whom to spend one’s life
with or whether to have children, and pedestrian, everyday ones. And facing them
freely means having the opportunity to think about and deliberate over one’s
options, considering them against the backdrop of one’s beliefs, desires, and
commitments, and ultimately deciding for reasons one recognises and endorses as
one’s own, absent unwelcome influence.”). Manipulation “subverts and insults a
person’s autonomous decision-making.” Wilkinson, supra note 62, at 345.
125
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 29, at 1; see also Kalliris, supra
note 112, at 1.
126
Authentic choice is free from manipulation, coercion, fraud, deception, etc.,
or as close as one can get.
127
Zarsky, supra note 46, at 172; Calo, supra note 8, at 1025. “According to
this economically-driven line of thought, a successful manipulation will generate
a suboptimal transaction, in which individuals fail to properly exercise their
preferences.” Zarsky, supra note 46, at 172. “[C]onsumers confronted with
manipulation eventually do not act in accordance with their preferences, thus
leading to suboptimal outcome.” Id. at 173.
128
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (1859). According to Mill, “[T]he
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise,
or even right.” Id. at 17. Mill is often cited to explain why society supports choiceas-consent at the level of the individual. See also Giovanni De Gregorio & Sofia
Ranchordas, Breaking Down Information Silos with Big Data: A Legal Analysis
of Data Sharing, LEGAL CHALLENGES OF BIG DATA (Edward Elgar Publishing,
2020).
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individual knows his own tastes, values, interests, and preferences.
As Professor Friedrich August Hayek famously argued:
It is with respect to this [knowledge of the particular circumstances of
time and place] that practically every individual has some advantage
over all others because he possesses unique information of which
beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the
decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active
cooperation.129

Individuals themselves are in the best position to understand their
competing demands and preferences and to make the best decision
in their interest.130
3.

Legitimacy
The legitimacy argument for authentic choice can be seen as the
culmination of millions of efficient, autonomous decisions.
Supporting authentic choice at the level of the individual transaction
ensures the greatest autonomy possible in any given situation and
allows the individual to decide based on their own values, interests,
and preferences. In accordance with this sentiment, Professor
Fabienne Peter noted that “[t]he emphasis in economic theory on
freedom of choice in the market sphere suggests that legitimization
in the market sphere is ‘automatic’ and that markets can thus avoid
the typical legitimization problem of the state.”131 Freedom of
choice, for Peter, is the foundation of efficient and autonomous
decisions, which allows one to declare the market as legitimate.132
Manipulation, in undermining consumer choice, leads to the
transactional sins of diminishing the autonomy of the decision
129

Hayek, supra note 104, at 521–22.
Jacob Viner, in referencing 18th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham to
explain the role of choice, noted that “Bentham, in his general exposition, held
that to interfere with a free con- tract in a free market in the supposed interest of
the parties, where there was no recognized adverse impact on particular nonparticipants in the contract, would be to make the absurd assumptions that a
government or an official can know better than a man knows what that man wants,
and can know better than that man knows what are the most efficient means for
him of satisfying his wants.” Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez
Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 65 (1960).
131
Fabienne Peter, Choice, Consent, and the Legitimacy of Market
Transactions, 20 ECON. & PHIL. 1, 1 (2004).
132
See id.
130
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maker and inefficiently allocating resources. These transactional
sins aggregate to reduce the legitimacy of the market. In other
words, choice-as-consent helps justify the moral legitimacy of
transactions as a whole,133 and markets are legitimate when each
transaction is voluntary and free, as in, without coercion, fraud,
deception, or manipulation.134
C. How to Protect Authentic Choice in the Market
Manipulation is hardly the only problematic behavior that seeks
to undermine authentic choice in the market. To preserve market
integrity and legitimacy, choice is protected in the market by
seeking to eradicate any interference with private preferences.135 For
example, one protects choice by safeguarding market actors from
negotiating under duress, as well as by seeking to prevent
contractors from acting in bad faith,136 opportunistically, or
unconscionably.137 Deception is also aggressively governed in the
law,138 including false suggestions; concealment of the truth;

133
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 384, 384 (1985).
134
See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149 (vol. 5038
New York, Basic Books 1974) (noting that when the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) investigates and prosecutes insider trading and fraud, the
SEC does so in pursuit of maintaining legitimacy of the market).
135
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129, 1129 (1986).
136
In every contract are the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing in the
performance and enforcement of the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (A.L.I. 1981); U.C.C. § 1-304 (A.L.I. & UNIF. L. COMM’N
2017). The implied duty of good faith helps to protect consumers by ensuring that
parties with whom the consumer contracts act honestly and do not take advantage
of the consumer in the performance of their contract. Id. The Uniform
Commercial Code defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 1-201 (A.L.I. & UNIF.
L. COMM’N 2017).
137
Posner, supra note 15, at 267.
138
Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral
Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 157, 157 (2001).
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deception about facts, opinions, or law; and even intentional
ambiguities.139
Vulnerable consumers’ authentic choice is also protected to
maintain choice-as-consent. Vulnerable consumers are those actors
in the market with limited ability to authentically consent to a
transaction.140 Vulnerability is not necessarily a permanent attribute
of a relationship or an individual, and consumers can move in and
out of contexts that make them vulnerable.141 Individuals are
considered vulnerable, for example, during key stages in their
lives,142 when battling health challenges,143 or when in temporarily
vulnerable positions, such as after a hurricane or other natural
disaster.144
In sum, tactics that undermine choice-as-consent, such as
misrepresentation, power imbalance, coercion, and fraud, are
problematic because consumer choice under these conditions is not
an authentic or actual operationalization of consumers’ preferences.
As the next Part examines, choice has been actively protected in
markets by laws to preserve individual autonomy, transaction
efficiency, and market legitimacy.
139

Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 L.
& PHIL. 393, 393 (2003).
140
Targeting vulnerable consumers is part of the dark side of customer
relationship management. Gilles N’Goala, Opportunism, Transparency,
Manipulation, Deception and Exploitation of Customers’ Vulnerabilities in CRM,
in THE DARK SIDE OF CRM: CUSTOMERS, RELATIONSHIPS AND MANAGEMENT
122 (Bang Nguyen, Lyndon Simkin, Ana Isabel Canhoto eds., 2015).
141
Wided Batat, An Adolescent-Centric Approach to Consumer Vulnerability:
New Implications for Public Policy, in CONSUMER VULNERABILITY 117 (Kathy
Hamilton, Susan Dunnett, Maria Piacentini eds., 2015).
142
Some examples of key stages in life include: puberty, peer rejection, low
socioeconomic status, and family disharmony. Agnes Nairn, Children as
Vulnerable Consumers, in CONSUMER VULNERABILITY 93 (Kathy Hamilton,
Susan Dunnett, Maria Piacentini eds., 2015).
143
Health challenges (e.g., examine late-stage AIDS, breast cancer patients,
chronic illness, parents of significant disability) impact the agency and identity of
the consumer. Marlys J. Mason & Teresa Pavia, Health Shocks, Identity and
Consumer Vulnerability, in CONSUMER VULNERABILITY 159 (Kathy Hamilton,
Susan Dunnett, Maria Piacentini eds., 2015).
144
Ronald Paul Hill & Eesha Sharma, Consumer Vulnerability, 30 J.
CONSUMER PSYCH. 551, 551, 560 (2020).
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D. How Manipulation is Typically Regulated
Typically, the power to manipulate is regulated offline and
derives from a specific relationship where one party gains
knowledge or power to manipulate a vulnerable target, such as with
a lawyer, teacher, doctor, or therapist. In those relationships, rules
of professional conduct, laws, and contracts ensure those interests
remain aligned even when one party with knowledge and power is
in a position to manipulate.
Typically, sharing information with a particular market actor (a
firm or an individual) requires trust and other safeguards, such as
professional duties, contracts, negotiated alliances, nondisclosure
agreements, etc.145 A supplier might craft a contract, a nondisclosure agreement, or even enter an alliance in order for the
supplier to safely share concerns, preferences, forecasts, and risks.
For individuals, such information is also shared in trusted,
fiduciary relationships, such as with lawyers, therapists, or advisors.
In contrast, individuals do not typically share information freely
with marketers or salespersons; for example, an individual generally
would not share, with a car salesperson, how poorly their current car
is running or changes in their household finances, because the car
salesperson could then use that information against the individual’s
interest.146 Thus, manipulation is often prevented offline by ensuring
market actors with intimate information about a target’s
vulnerabilities are prevented from using that information against the
target.147
145

Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure:
from Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 171, 176 (2002).
146
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSPS. 113,
117 (1987) (“People with private information may not readily reveal it, especially
if they know that it will be used in a decision that affects them.”).
147
Professor Ryan Calo refers to this economic intimacy in a larger argument:
Discriminately sharing information between market actors is good for markets.
Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649,
650 (2016). In business, one focuses on a Coasian analysis of the safeguards
required to share information—with sharing information considered to be both
risky and rewarding for markets and market actors. Jeffrey S. Harrison, Douglas
A. Bosse & Robert A. Phillips, Managing for Stakeholders, Stakeholder Utility
Functions, and Competitive Advantage, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 58, 58 (2010);
Kirsten Martin & Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Friction, J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 1 (2021).
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IV. ORIGINAL MARKET SIN: PRIVACY-AS-CONCEALMENT
The situation explained above is odd: Firms can collect and
covertly use individualized information to undermine consumer
decisions. The incarnation of targeted manipulation online divorces
the intimate knowledge of the target, as well as the reach used to
manipulate, from a specific, trusting relationship. Now, firms—with
whom consumers have no relationship—have more information
about consumers’ preferences, concerns, and vulnerabilities than
even their doctors, lawyers, or therapists. In addition, these firms
can easily and directly reach specific targets due to the many
hyper-targeting mechanisms available online.148 Yet, consumers are
not privy to who has access to their information when a company
approaches them with targeted product suggestions or advertising.149
Given this economic anomaly, where data traffickers have the
intimate knowledge and proximity of a relationship without the
governance and trust inherent to such relationships in the market,
this Article next examines how firms gain positions of power to
exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses of individuals without the
requisite safeguards. Specifically, in a free market, how does
information that renders a market actor vulnerable get into the hands
of firms whose interests do not align with theirs?
This current market problem—where firms, whose interests do
not align with consumers, have the knowledge and position to
manipulate consumers—is due to the mistaken notion that disclosed
information can be freely shared and used. This perceived free-forall where, as Professor Helen Nissenbaum notes, “anything goes,”
relies on privacy as only that which is concealed.150 By disclosing
information, individuals are mistakenly framed as relinquishing any
expectation of privacy, and the information is no longer governed
by formal or informal norms.151
148

Supra, Part I.
Plus, firms and individuals are usually on guard to possible manipulation
since they know the potential manipulator has information on their vulnerabilities;
that is currently not the case online.
150
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119,
137 (2004).
151
Now, individuals in the United States need not even ‘disclose’ information.
In just being, individuals are assumed to be tracked.
149
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After connecting the original sin of the market, using privacyas-concealment, where disclosed information no longer has privacy
expectations, to consumer manipulation, this Article then illustrates
the influence of privacy-as-concealment on how privacy is studied
and regulated in economics and policy.
A. The Concept of Privacy-as-Concealment
In an important examination of the economics of privacy,
Professors Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George
Loewenstein linked privacy-as-concealment to scholarship in the
1970s and 1980s: “The roots of economic research on privacy
(which can be found in seminal writings of scholars such as Richard
Posner and George Stigler) focus on privacy as the concealment,”152
where consumer privacy is equated to consumers’ ability to conceal
information.153 This definition was useful to the field since privacyas-concealment is easy to identify and model in economic analyses;
market actors would make a binary (and easily measured) decision

152

Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, What Is
Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 251 (2013); see also Avi Goldfarb, What
Is Different About Online Advertising?, 44 REV. INDUS. ORG. 115, 251 (2014).
Both Posner and Stigler frame the concealment as information that is “private”
and the disclosure of information as not private. See Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 405 (1981); Richard A. Posner,
The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978); George J. Stigler, An
Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 643
(1980).
153
Stigler and Posner also posit privacy (as concealment) as either increasing
or diminishing the “wealth of society,” and both make public policy suggestions
with privacy-as-concealment as their assumptions and wealth maximization as
their goal. Professor Julie Cohen rightly criticizes Posner’s goal of “wealth
maximization”: “Within a liberal market economy, it is an article of faith that both
firms and individuals should be able to seek and use information that (they
believe) will make them economically better off.” Julie E. Cohen, Privacy,
Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2032
(2000) (reviewing JEFFERY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000)). This Article agrees with this second critique of the
foundations of the economics of privacy. Here, this Article focuses on the fallacy
that privacy is only that which is concealed.
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to either conceal information (i.e., protect privacy) or disclose it
(i.e., relinquish privacy).154
This approach to defining privacy-as-concealment renders
privacy inefficient to a functioning market since (in principle)
relevant, concealed information could be helpful to better
transactions.155 Thus, privacy-as-concealment fed easily into the
economics of information scholarship, which focused on
information as being critical for markets to run efficiently, including
marriage markets, consumer goods markets, and employment
markets.156 Economists could then summarize: “Privacy is harmful
to efficiency because it stops information flows that would
otherwise lead to improved levels of economic exchange.”157 Since
154
Contrary to popular musings about privacy having no definitions, privacy
definitions fall into three broad categories; concealment is only one. The most
popular two are: the “restricted access” version of privacy (that which is private
is inaccessible or concealed), and the “control” version of privacy (that which is
private is controlled). The standard economic version of privacy is the first
definition, whereby information that is concealed is private. This definition is
attractive for practical reasons in that it is easy to measure (either someone
discloses information or does not) in surveys and in the field. Further, the
definition is binary (disclosed or concealed), making models easier.
Unfortunately, while privacy-as-concealment is easy to model or make
assumptions about, it is not reflective of how people operationalize privacy in
their lived experience. Privacy as Contextual Integrity or Privacy as a Social
Contract both define privacy as the rules or norms that govern who, what, and
how data is gathered and used. Violations of privacy are the breaking of those
rules or norms. This concept is further explored below. See Professor Daniel
Solove and the anthology edited by Professor Schoemann for overviews of the
definition of privacy. See generally Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Philosophical
Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477 (2006) (defining privacy).
155
Stigler, supra note 152, at 625.
156
Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra note 152, at 405 (“An example is
the marriage ‘market.’ The efficient sorting of females to males in that market is
impeded if either spouse conceals material personal information.”).
157
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Privacy, Property Rights and
Efficiency: The Economics of Privacy as Secrecy, 4 QUANTITATIVE MKTG. &
ECON. 209, 211 (2006). Traditionally, concealment is considered inefficient: “[I]t
reduces the amount of information in the market, and hence the efficiency with
which the market—whether the market for labor, or spouses, or friends—allocates
resources.” Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra note 152, at 406. However,
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information is, in general, important to reducing transaction costs
(such as the ability to identify and find trading partners, settle on a
price, or close the transaction), less information is broadly framed
as bad or inefficient for the market.158
More importantly, the privacy-as-concealment construct has
allowed firms to gather intimate information about consumers and
then use that information to covertly undermine their decisions.159
Recognizing privacy-as-concealment is important in order to
understand the current economic anomaly where firms with interests
not aligned with consumers have intimate information about those
individuals. For privacy-as-concealment, disclosed information is
not governed by privacy expectations since the information is no
longer concealed.160 In disclosing information, or even merely being
in public or being online, consumers are seen from a legal
perspective as relinquishing privacy.161 Firms are then permitted—
even expected—to gather, aggregate, sell, and use the information
to create value for themselves.162
However, the concept of privacy-as-concealment was put
forward under very specific assumptions by Posner and Stigler.163
Their arguments presumed that information would only be shared if
consumers trusted the other party and that information-sharing

Hermalin and Katz have found that, “(a) privacy can be efficient even when there
is no “taste” for privacy per se, and (b) to be effective, a privacy policy may need
to ban information transmission or use rather than simply assign individuals
control rights to their personally identifiable data.” Hermalin & Katz, supra note
157, at 209.
158
The theory in economics based on the privacy-as-concealment concept by
Posner and Stigler would be that privacy is equal to concealing information, and
concealing information is bad for markets; therefore, privacy is bad for markets.
See generally Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra note 152; Stigler, supra
note 152.
159
Supra Part IV.A.
160
Supra Part IV.A.
161
Supra Part IV.A.
162
Supra Part IV.A.
163
See generally Stigler, supra note 152; Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra
note 152.
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would always be helpful to the consumer.164 Specifically, Posner and
Stigler assumed the following:
(a) Firms were assumed to never gather too much information.
The cost will dissuade firms from “idly” surveilling people.165
(b) Data gathering, storage, and retrieval was assumed to be
expensive and time consuming such that no company would
store, sell, and traffic in data. Firms would always ask for
information directly from the consumer.166
(c) Extraneous consumer information was assumed to be
ignored.167
(d) If the collection, sharing, and use of data violated expectations
or norms, the resultant cost of upsetting individuals was
assumed to be felt by those firms actually gathering and

164

See generally Stigler, supra note 152, at 1; Posner, The Right of Privacy,
supra note 152.
165
Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra note 152, at 394; Stigler, supra note 152,
at 628–29 (“Exhaustive information costs more than it is worth; complete
ignorance would make rational conduct impossible. Hence in all economic and
social life, we resort to clarification.”).
166
“The storage and retrieval of information, and its accurate dissemination, are
often extremely expensive, and in a vast number of situations it is much cheaper
to produce the information anew rather than to seek it out.” Stigler, supra note
152, at 625.
167
Inappropriate information (race/sex) will not be used in decisions: “The third
misuse (use of “bad” information) presents a conflict between social (majority)
and individual preferences or knowledge, often with the implications that it is
empirically inefficient as well as legally wrong to take the designated
characteristic into account.” Id. at 625. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra
note 152, at 406 (“It is sometimes argued that people will misuse private
information—will attach excessive weight to knowledge that a prospective
employee has a criminal record, or is a homosexual, or has a history of mental
illness. However, the literature on the economics of nonmarket behavior suggests
that people are rational even in non-market transactions, such as marriage, and in
market transactions, even in regard to such apparently emotional factors as race
and sex (see, for example, Gary Becker and Edmund Phelps). Therefore, there
seems to be no solid basis for questioning the competence of individuals to attach
appropriate (which will often be slight) weight to private information, at least if
‘appropriate’ is equated with ‘efficient.’”).
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storing the data.168 Therefore, all collection, sharing, and use
of information would be sanctioned by the empowered
consumer.
Essentially, Posner and Stigler assumed that the market would
fix bad behavior regarding data collection and use; if an organization
collected intrusive information or collected information in a
coercive manner, the affected people would walk away, and the
company would have lower quality employees or no customers.
Plus, economists assumed people would not reveal their
information, especially if people knew their information would be
used in an organization’s decision that affected them.169 Therefore,
at the time, economists could assume that the interests of the
individual and the firm aligned (better advertising, better product
offerings, better transaction costs, etc.).170
These assumptions worked during the first wave of privacy
scholarship in economics, when the only actor with enough money
and reach to collect large amounts of information was the
government.171 However, the proliferation of data trackers and the
ease, value, and cost of trafficking information now render these
assumptions almost quaint. Storage, retrieval, and sharing are cheap
and accurate, and data traffickers collecting and using data have no

168

The requesting organization—government or private actor—will feel the
market effects of requesting inappropriate information. Stigler, supra note 152, at
627 (“[I]t will pay for this burden through higher wage rates or lower quality
employees.”). If it is the state requesting inappropriate information, one can
assume the state is correct in asking for it. See id.
169
Farrell, supra note 146, at 117.
170
Supra Part I.
171
Stigler, supra note 152, at 623. The first assumption in this era of scholarship
was that the entity that could surveil consumers was the government, the only
actor with the money and reach to collect data. Id. (“Governments (at all levels)
are now collecting information of a quantity and in a personal detail unknown in
history. Consider the following: It would have been quite impossible for a public
official in 1860 to learn anything about the income of a citizen chosen at random
without leaving Washington, D.C. Today the files of Social Security, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the microfilms of
banking transactions, and other sources are potentially available to answer the
question, to say nothing of the fact that perhaps one family in three or four receives
payments directly or indirectly from the federal government.”).
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relationship with the consumer.172 In fact, these facets of the
information economy—the cheap and easy collection and storage of
data and the ability to make sense of the data to target individuals—
are lauded as important steps forward in the advancement of
artificial intelligence (“AI”) and “Big Data.”173 However, the same
facets also undermine key assumptions made in putting forth the
concept of privacy-as-concealment as useful or reflective of privacy
expectations.174
B. The Reach of Privacy-as-Concealment
Yet, privacy-as-concealment still infects academic and public
policy discourse and has provided the building blocks of regulatory
and academic examinations of privacy.175 Privacy-as-concealment
has thus remained a force in marketing, economics, public policy,
and law; privacy-as-concealment guides the generalizations drawn
from surveys and the implications made for public policy and
practice. For example, behavioral studies of “privacy” measure how
much an individual would be willing to pay (“WTP”) for privacy
versus how much an individual would be willing to accept (“WTA”)
a privacy violation.176 This WTA/WTP scholarship relies on
privacy-as-concealment by measuring the respondents’ WTP to
172

Supra Part I.
See Hind Benbya, Thomas H. Davenport & Stella Pachidi, Artificial
Intelligence in Organizations: Current State and Future Opportunities, 19 MIS
Q. EXEC. 9, 9 (2020); Thomas H. Davenport & Rajeev Ronanki, Artificial Intelligence
for the Real World, 96 HARV. BUS. REV. (2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/artificialintelligence-for-the-real-world [https://perma.cc/Y73Z-Y6PP].
174
See Varian, Artificial Intelligence, Economics, and Industrial Organization,
supra note 83, at 416. Tucker also emphasizes that privacy in its modern, most
used form is currently challenged for three reasons: “(1) cheap storage means that
data may persist longer than the person who generated the data intended, (2) nonrivalry means that data may be repurposed for uses other than originally intended,
and (3) externalities mean that data created by one individual may contain
information about others.” CATHERINE TUCKER, Economics of Privacy and User‐
Generated Content, EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, SEARCHABLE, AND LINKABLE RESOURCE 201 (2015).
175
See Goldfarb, supra note 152, at 123; Acquisti, Taylor & Wagman, supra
note 80, at 450.
176
Angela G. Winegar & Cass R. Sunstein, How Much is Data Privacy Worth?
A Preliminary Investigation, 42 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 425, 426 (2019).
173
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conceal information and equating their WTP with privacy.177 This
research broadly measures consumers’ valuation of “privacy” by
measuring a valuation of concealment, thereby assuming that
information cannot be disclosed with privacy expectations.178
Similar measurements of privacy-concerns operationalize privacyas-concealment, such as by assessing whether consumers reveal
their income in a survey.179 This operationalization leads academics
to generalize every disclosure of information as an indication that
consumers or respondents do not value privacy.180
This privacy paradox is perhaps the most harmful concept based
on the original framing of privacy-as-concealment. The privacy
paradox refers to the supposed inconsistencies between individuals’
stated privacy preferences in their survey responses and their actual
behavior.181 For example, respondents indicate a concern for privacy
in a survey and then researchers measure whether the respondents
would disclose information online or to researchers or report to have
used a social networking app.182 Researchers can then generalize the
177

Acquisti, John & Loewenstein, supra note 152, at 249 (“Individuals assigned
markedly different values to the privacy of their data depending on (1) whether
they were asked to consider how much money they would accept to disclose
otherwise private information or how much they would pay to protect otherwise
public information and (2) the order in which they considered different offers for
their data.”).
178
Winegar & Sunstein, supra note 176, at 425. Alternatively, “[w]e investigate
changes to the value that individuals place on the online disclosure of their private
information in the presence of multiple privacy factors. We use an incentivecompatible mechanism to capture individuals’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) for a
privacy disclosure in a series of three randomized experiments.” Joseph R.
Buckman, Jesse C. Bockstedt & Matthew J. Hashim, Relative Privacy Valuations
Under Varying Disclosure Characteristics, 30 INFO. SYS. RES. 375, 375 (2019).
179
“[W]e measure how consumers’ privacy concerns have changed using three
million observations collected by a market research company from 2001-2008,
covering whether consumers chose to protect their privacy by not revealing their
income in an online survey.” Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Shifts in Privacy
Concerns, 102 AM. ECON. RSCH. 349, 349 (2012).
180
See id.
181
Kirsten Martin, Breaking the Privacy Paradox: The Value of Privacy and
Associated Duty of Firms, 30 BUS. ETHICS Q. 65, 65 (2020).
182
Patricia Norberg, Daniel Horne, and David Horne, in one of the first articles
naming the privacy paradox, explicitly define privacy as that which is concealed
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study to posit that people claim to care about privacy but show little
concern about it in their daily behavior.183
Importantly, the evidence of individuals not caring about
privacy, or relinquishing privacy in practice, centers on individuals
merely disclosing information. In a recent review of the privacy
paradox as a concept, Professors Nina Gerber, Paul Gerber, and
Melanie Volkamer provide examples of how individuals
demonstrate their indifference to keeping their information private:
“[30%] of the respondents would even trade their e-mail address for
money or the chance to win a prize or be entered in a raffle and 17%
are willing to give it away in exchange for access to an app.”184
Similarly, in a summary of information privacy scholarship,
Professors Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev, and Heng Xu noted the
prevalence of a privacy paradox identified in research where,
“despite reported high privacy concerns, consumers still readily
submit their personal information in a number of circumstances.”185
The proof of (not) caring about privacy in practice is, according to
privacy paradox researchers, demonstrated by consumers (not)
concealing information.186
where the paradox lies in the inconsistency between respondents’ intentions to
disclose and their actual disclosure behavior. Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R.
Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information
Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 100, 100 (2007).
183
For a summary of the definition and operationalization of the privacy
paradox, see Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein,
Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509, 509 (2015).
184
Nina Gerber, Paul Gerber & Melanie Volkamer, Explaining the Privacy
Paradox: A Systematic Review of Literature Investigating Privacy Attitude and
Behavior, 77 COMPUTS. & SEC. 226, 227 (2018) (summarizing individuals’
paradoxical behavior by observing that, “[o]n the one hand, users express
concerns about the handling of their personal data and report a desire to protect
their data, whereas at the same time, they not only voluntarily give away these
personal data by posting details of their private life in social networks or using
fitness trackers and online shopping websites which include profiling functions,
but also rarely make an effort to protect their data actively, for example through
the deletion of cookies on a regular basis or the encryption of their e-mail
communication.”).
185
H. Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev & Heng Xu, Information Privacy Research:
An Interdisciplinary Review, 35 MIS Q. 989, 993 (2011).
186
See id.; Martin, supra note 181.
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To explain the penchant to disclose information, scholars have
linked this paradoxical behavior to the privacy calculus,187 whereby
individuals relinquish information (framed by scholars as
“relinquishing privacy”188) in order to receive the benefits of going
online. In each case of the privacy paradox or the privacy calculus,
individuals are assumed to relinquish privacy upon the disclosure of
information, and only information that is not disclosed is considered
private.189
This Article argues that the privacy paradox is the most
dangerous concept emanating from the privacy-as-concealment
framework because this concept encourages firms to increase their
collection and use of personal information without needing to worry
about privacy expectations. Consumer-facing firms, marketers, and
advertising advocacy groups use the privacy paradox to justify their
current data practices, while also reporting data that shows
consumers overwhelmingly find such practices problematic and
unsettling.190 Framing individuals as acting “paradoxically” in
regard to privacy when disclosing information, going online, or

187

See Martin, supra note 59, at 66 (“[F]or the privacy paradox to persist, one
of two assumptions is necessary: (a) that when consumers disclose information
and engage with firms, they also relinquish privacy expectations; or (b) that
privacy is a preference that is easily negotiated away in the market. Philosophers
and legal scholars, on the other hand, argue that reasonable privacy expectations
exist post-disclosure and that privacy is a right similar to a core value to be
respected at all times.”).
188
Id. See Gerber, Gerber & Volkamer, supra note 184, at 226; Paul A. Pavlou,
State of the Information Privacy Literature: Where Are We Now and Where
Should We Go?, MIS Q. 977, 979 (2011).
189
Researchers equate the disclosure of information to “privacy-compromising
behavior” in validating the privacy paradox. See Susanne Barth & Menno D.T. de
Jong, The Privacy Paradox–Investigating Discrepancies Between Expressed
Privacy Concerns and Actual Online Behavior–A Systematic Literature Review,
34 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 1038, 1039 (2017).
190
See Martin, supra note 59, at 65; Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy Attitudes and
Privacy Behaviour: A Review of Current Research on the Privacy Paradox
Phenomenon, 64 COMPUTS. & SEC. 122, 122 (2017).
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using an app relies upon a definition of privacy as only that which
is concealed.191
C. Alternative Approaches to Privacy
Defining privacy as only that which is concealed has infected
economics, public policy, social science, and legal scholarship,
thereby leading scholars and practitioners to argue that individuals
relinquish privacy expectations when disclosing information.192
However, scholars have begun to focus on the privacy of revealed
or public information.193 This shift is critical, since these theories—
that disclosed information retains privacy expectations—would not
allow intimate knowledge of individuals’ vulnerabilities to be
placed in the hands of firms who can manipulate those individuals
(i.e., targets).
Rather than view the disclosure of information as a signal of
relinquishing privacy, more context-dependent definitions of
privacy posit that the individual who shares the information does so
191

In fact, the term ‘paradox’ is defined as “a statement that is seemingly or opposed
to common sense and yet [when investigated or explained] is perhaps true.” MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradox [https://perma.cc/
54Y9-BKJA] (emphasis added) (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). This author thanks
Alessandro Acquisti for pointing out the actual definition of paradox in reference
to the privacy paradox. Many scholars have gone on to investigate this seemingly
self-contradicting behavior. Often the privacy paradox is explained by countering
this supposed calculus performed: Consumers cannot be expected to know or
understand the privacy implications of their decision given the structure of the
data markets online. See Waldman, supra note 13, at 105; Acquisti, Brandimarte
& Loewenstein, supra note 183, at 509. In fact, contrary to the privacy paradox,
consumers retain strong privacy expectations even after disclosing information.
Martin, supra note 59, at 65. Referring to going online or using an app as
somehow paradoxical in regard to privacy would be like describing women who
work in companies (or universities) as falling into the discrimination paradox:
They claim to not like being discriminated against yet continue to work in these
organizations.
192
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
193
See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The
Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 L. & PHIL. 559 (1998); Robert Gellman, Public
Records—Access, Privacy, and Public Policy: A Discussion Paper, 12 GOV’T
INFO. Q. 391 (1995); Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 459 (2017); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV.
141 (2014).
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within a specific community or relationship of trust, or within a
specific context of privacy norms.194 Professor Ari Waldman offers
a theory of privacy—privacy as trust—as counter to the “traditional
division between public and private.”195 Within this privacy as trust
theory, individuals disclose information within trust relationships—
with expectations as to how their information will be shared and
used.196 Relatedly, Professors Woody Hartzog and Neil Richards
conceptualize privacy as reinforcing trust within established
relationships.197 Separately, Hartzog suggests that information
disclosed carries with it an understanding of confidentiality as to
how that information should be used and shared, and that
understanding should carry forward to all other parties who are
given access to such information.198 Each context-specific approach
194

See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (Stanford Univ. Press ed., 2010);
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS 32
(2011); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a
Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559 (2014); Richards & Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Kirsten Martin, Understanding Privacy
Online: Development of a Social Contract Approach to Privacy, 137 J. BUS.
ETHICS 551 (2016); Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L.
REV. 657 (2011); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007) (carving out
privacy norms around disclosed information). For more specific examples of
measuring privacy norms in public, see JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS
REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT, 3–4
(2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478214 [https://
perma.cc/T4N4-NYAC]); Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the PostSnowden Era, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ [https://perma.cc/67MF-EFAS].
195
Waldman, supra note 194, at 560.
196
Id. at 559 (“Rather than accept the traditional division between public and
private, and rather than begin and end the discussion of privacy as an individual
right, this Article bridges social science and the law to argue that disclosures in
contexts of trust are private.”).
197
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22,
at 431 (“[P]rivacy can and should be thought of as enabling trust in our essential
information relationships.”).
198
Hartzog, supra note 194, at 659 (“A chain-link confidentiality regime would
contractually link the disclosure of personal information to obligations to protect
that information as it is disclosed downstream.”).
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governs how information should be treated post-disclosure or when
not concealed.
Where Hartzog, Richards, and Waldman focus on trust as the
basis for privacy expectations of disclosed information, other
scholars have sought to identify specific types of disclosed
information—sensitive,199 sexual,200 intellectual,201 or sheer
quantity202—as requiring privacy protection post disclosure.
Professor Julie Cohen takes an alternative approach, arguing instead
that the debate about data privacy protection should be grounded in
an appreciation of the conditions necessary for individuals to
develop and exercise autonomy and that meaningful autonomy
requires a degree of freedom from monitoring, scrutiny, and
categorization by others.203 In contrast, Professor Solove proposes a
taxonomy of privacy, without settling on one definition, in order to
incorporate the many ways individuals have privacy expectations of
both concealed and disclosed information.204

199

Ohm, supra note 6, at 1128.
Danielle Keats Citron, A New Compact for Sexual Privacy, 62 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1763, 1768 (2021) (“Sexual privacy concerns the social norms governing
the management of boundaries around intimate life. It involves the extent to which
others have access to and information about people’s naked bodies (notably the
parts of the body associated with sex and gender); their sexual desires, fantasies,
and thoughts; communications related to their sex, sexuality, and gender; and
intimate activities (including, but not limited, to sexual intercourse.”).
201
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008)
(“Intellectual privacy is the ability, whether protected by law or social
circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted gaze or
interference of others.”).
202
David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy,
98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 100 (2013) (“[W]e can and should maintain expectations of
privacy in large quanta of personal information.”).
203
Cohen, supra note 20, at 1377 (“On this theory, one must, if one values the
individual as an agent of self-determination and community-building, take
seriously a conception of data privacy that returns control over much personal
data to the individual. We must carve out protected zones of personal autonomy,
so that productive expression and development can have room to flourish. We can
do so—constitutionally—by creating a limited right against certain kinds of
commercial collection and use of personally-identified information.”).
204
Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,
supra note 194, at 745; Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 154, at 1756.
200
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Another approach to privacy is a social contract approach,
whereby individuals discriminately share information within a
community with an understanding of the privacy norms governing
that community.205 Individuals reveal information with an
understanding of who would be able to receive that information as
well as how and why the information would be used.206 When one
talks about privacy expectations, one identifies the implicit and
explicit norms about how information is expected to flow in a given
community.207
Professor Helen Nissenbaum has been consistently (and
persistently) arguing for and developing a theory of privacy in
public.208 According to Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity,
privacy is respected when norms of appropriate information flow are
respected.209 The norms of information flow—the rules as to how
information flows, to whom, and what kind of information—are
dependent on the context of the information.210 Norms of
205

Martin, Understanding Privacy Online: Development of a Social Contract
Approach to Privacy, supra note 194, at 551.
206
Id. at 557.
207
Contractors in all communities have rights of voice, exit, and entry, or norms
are developed as if all contractors have rights of voice, exit, and entry. However,
rights to exit and entry are macro norms; the real work of social contract theories
is the identification and application of the actual privacy norms that are developed
in the community.
208
In 1998, Nissenbaum identified the problem of privacy in public: “While not
denying the importance of protecting intimate and sensitive information, this
paper insists that theories of privacy should also recognize the systematic
relationship between privacy and information that is neither intimate nor sensitive
and is drawn from public spheres.” Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an
Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, supra note 194, at 559;
Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, supra note 195; Martin
& Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public Records: An Empirical Investigation,
supra note 4, at 117 (“One difficulty in conceptualizing ‘privacy in public’ is the
association of the word ‘privacy’ with information that is inaccessible to others.
If privacy is that which is not disclosed or utterly obscure, and if public means
being accessible, then something is either private or public and cannot be both.
The dichotomy that follows from this—of information being secret-or-not or
private-or-not—leads to the incorrect conclusion ‘that there is no claim to privacy
when information appears in a public record.’”).
209
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 194 at 3–4.
210
See id.
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information flow for education, for example, differ from norms of
information flow for public health. Importantly, Nissenbaum’s
theory of contextual integrity is explicitly tied to the privacy of
disclosed information. Rather than assume “anything goes” when
information is disclosed, Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual
integrity identifies how individuals have reasonable expectations of
privacy for disclosed information.211 In fact, where privacy-asconcealment assumes privacy norms are not applicable for disclosed
information, Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity really
begins to hit its stride in identifying privacy norms once information
is disclosed within a given context.
What justifies these privacy norms of disclosed information
differs across these scholars; in fact, they do not always agree.212
However, all argue that information is disclosed with expectations
of privacy attached as to who will have access to the information,
what uses will be appropriate, and how the information will flow.
For trust-based approaches to privacy, these expectations are
defined by trust between an individual and a collector of
information.213 For privacy as contextual integrity, norms of
appropriate flow would dictate the expectations of information
privacy based on a specific context (e.g., health care versus
education versus commerce).214 For privacy as a social contract, the
expectations of privacy are the micro-norms negotiated within a
defined community.215
211
Martin & Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public Records: An Empirical
Investigation, supra note 4, at 121 (“One immediate consequence of defining
informational privacy as contextual integrity can be observed in the approach to
privacy of public data. Privacy is not lost, traded off, given away, or violated
simply because control over information is ceded or because information is shared
or disclosed, only if ceded or disclosed inappropriately. Releasing information is
not the same as giving up privacy if the flow is appropriate.”).
212
See, e.g., Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Measuring Privacy: Using
Context to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 176,
176 (2017).
213
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22,
at 431.
214
NISSENBAUM, supra note 194, at 3–4.
215
Kirsten Martin, Understanding Privacy Online: Development of a Social
Contract Approach to Privacy, supra note 194, at 551.
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This shift—from disclosed information being free from all
privacy expectations to disclosed information having defined
privacy expectations within a particular context, community, or
relationship—is important for the governance of the flow of
information that is disclosed or public. In a more recent analysis of
the economics of privacy, Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman noted that
privacy is not the opposite of sharing and allowed for the possible
benefits of sharing data, as well as the potential costs of sharing data
with the wrong parties.216
When research assumes the existence of privacy expectations of
disclosed information, scholars have measured how much
respondents care about the privacy of their disclosed information.217
Even in economics, when scholars have taken consumer concerns
into consideration, scholars find that consumers need protection
through regulations218 or find the consumers benefit from
216

Costs can range from price discrimination to other, more odious forms of
discrimination; from social stigma to blackmailing; from intangible nuisances to
identity theft. “Individuals can benefit from protecting the security of their data to
avoid the misuse of information they share with other entities. However, they also
benefit from the sharing of information with peers and third parties that results in
mutually satisfactory interactions.” Acquisti, Taylor & Wagman, supra note 80,
at 462.
217
For example, Helen Nissenbaum and this Author have measured
individuals’ nuanced expectations of privacy about who should collect location
data or public records and how either will be used. Kirsten Martin & Helen
Nissenbaum, What Is It About Location?, 35 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 251, 251
(2020); Martin & Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public Records: An Empirical
Investigation, supra note 4, at 111. Katie Shilton’s research show that individuals
have strong expectations of privacy about information collected by trackers online
or in apps. Katie Shilton, Four Billion Little Brothers?: Privacy, Mobile Phones,
and Ubiquitous Data Collection, 52 COMMC’NS. ACM 48, 48 (2009). Alice
Marwick and danah boyd have also shown adolescents’ expectations of privacy
online. Alice Marwick, The Public Domain: Surveillance in Everyday Life,
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 378, 378 (2012); Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd,
Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context in Social Media, 16 NEW
MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051, 1051 (2014). Karen Levy has focused on identifying
privacy of individuals while working. Karen E.C. Levy, The Contexts of Control:
Information, Power, and Truck-Driving Work, 31 INFO. SOC’Y 160, 160 (2015).
218
Florian Hoffmann et al., Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy:
Implications for Marketing and Campaigning 5 (Innocenzo Gasparini Inst. for
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personalized pricing219 and promotion when given control over what
data is disclosed to the targeting firm,220 or find the seller is better
off not using personalized pricing.221 Moreover, in the criminal law
context, there has been a shift to acknowledge the privacy
expectations for disclosed information.222
In many ways, the governance of information in the commercial
sphere has fallen behind other information governance areas by
relying on privacy-as-concealment, thereby allowing the situation
where firms have access to intimate knowledge about individuals’
vulnerabilities and are able to manipulate consumers at scale. In
relying on privacy-as-concealment, lawmakers and scholars were
left with few reasons to regulate disclosed information and took a
more libertarian—or “anything goes”—approach to public
information.223

Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 479, 2013) (“[H]ypertargeting—the collection
and use of personally identifiable data by firms to tailor selective disclosure—
should benefit consumers when they are adequately protected by at least one of
the following three conditions: their own wariness, competition, or the inability
of firms to practice personalized pricing. A strong rationale for regulation emerges
only when all three conditions are not met, that is, when a monopolist practices
both selective communication and personalized pricing to exploit unwary
consumers.”); see also Johnson, supra note 95, at 128.
219
But see supra Part II.C. (discussing how personalized pricing can be used to
manipulate consumers in discriminatory ways).
220
S. Nageeb Ali, Gregory Lewis & Shoshana Vasserman, Voluntary
Disclosure and Personalized Pricing 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 26592, 2021). The authors examined “what happens when consumers
fully control their data—not only whether they are tracked, but what specific
information is disclosed to firms” and found that consumers benefit from
personalized pricing when given control over what information they disclose. Id.
221
“[T]he seller prefers to commit to not use information for pricing in order to
encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the
consumer, who could be better off by precommitting to withhold some
information.” Shota Ichihashi, Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by
Consumers, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 569, 569 (2020).
222
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2246, 2256 (2018) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see id. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting).
223
Goldfarb, supra note 152, at 123 (“That stream of work [reliant on Posner
and Stigler] emphasized the challenges in understanding reasons to regulate
privacy when information flows should create efficiencies.”).
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V. HOW TO GOVERN MANIPULATION ONLINE
Online targeted manipulation undermines the authentic choice
of consumers in the market.224 This Article next proposes how online
manipulation might be minimized and how the authentic choice of
consumers, the efficiency of transactions, and the legitimacy of the
market may be protected through such safeguards.
Importantly, firms are now in a position to manipulate
consumers because relying on privacy-as-concealment has resulted
in a more laissez-faire approach to the flow of disclosed
information; information disclosed by individuals is viewed as
having few rules governing whether and how the information should
be shared and used.225 Scholars have shown that the current U.S.
policy, which focuses on the disclosure of information with
adequate notification, does not work.226 However, this Article argues
that the disclosure of information, even with privacy notices, does
not matter to whether privacy expectations exist. Focusing on mere
224

As Posner notes, manipulation that undermines choice is regularly governed,
such as when negotiating contracts under duress or undue influence or when
contractors act in bad faith, opportunistically, or unconscionably. Posner, supra
note 15, at 272.
225
Supra Part IV.B.
226
The argument that mere notification does not work has been around for
years, with many attempts to have notification work better. See generally Lorrie
Faith Cranor et al., Are They Worth Reading? An In-Depth Analysis of Online
Trackers’ Privacy Policies, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 325 (2015);
Martin, supra note 41; Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An
Empirical Investigation into How Complying with a Privacy Notice Is Related to
Meeting Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 210 (2015);
Kirsten Martin, Do Privacy Notices Matter? Comparing the Impact of Violating
Formal Privacy Notices and Informal Privacy Norms on Consumer Trust Online,
45 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (2016); Hirsch, supra note 24, at 439. More recently,
scholars have argued for more substantive laws around privacy and information
flow, seemingly giving up on notification as a useful tool. See Solon Barocas &
Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, PROC.
ENGAGING DATA F.: FIRST INT’L F. APPLICATION & MGMT. PERS. ELEC. INFO. 1,
1 (2009); Waldman, supra note 194, at 559; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne
Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 345 (2014);
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 431 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan, A Design for Public
Trustee and Privacy Protection Regulation, 44 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 487, 487–
90 (2020).
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notification is a shield for bad corporate behavior; mere notification
places the onus on the consumer to make sense of an unknowable
situation without any limitations on the data gathered. Further,
scholars and legislators have begun designing more substantive laws
about how information flows online rather than processing rules
about adequate notification and choice of consumers.227
Governing targeted manipulation online will require placing
responsibility on those in the position to manipulate rather than
attempting to identify each instance of targeted manipulation. This
Article makes two unique suggestions to regulate such
manipulation. First, additional safeguards are needed to limit data
aggregators and ad networks—specifically, any data trafficker with
knowledge of individuals’ vulnerabilities and without any
relationship with consumers—and ensure the use of information is
in the interests of the consumer. These safeguards should be
enforced by external auditors. Second, consumer-facing companies
should be responsible for the third parties that access their users—
either for the collection of data or for the targeting of content—and
ensure these third parties abide by standards of care.
A. Difficulties in Governing Manipulation
Three facets of targeted manipulation by data traffickers strain
our current mechanisms governing privacy and consumer data. First,
identifying manipulation is difficult not only because the actor is
hidden from the target but also because, by definition, the target’s
decision is modified in a way that is not known to the target.228 The
difficulty in identifying manipulation from the perspective of the
227

Exemplary calls have been made for more due process around consumer
data-based decisions. See generally Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and
Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55
B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1 (2014). See also Senator Brian Schatz’s proposed Data Care Act of 2018. S.
3744, 115th Cong. (2018).
228
Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 345. Recall that the phenomenon of interest of
this Article is targeted manipulation as the covert leveraging of a specific target’s
vulnerabilities to steer their decisions to the manipulator’s interests.
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target (or others) makes regulating specific acts or relying on
consumers to identify manipulation in the market untenable.229
Second, the type of manipulation described herein is performed
by multiple economic actors, as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Consumer-facing websites and apps that gain the trust of
the individual;
Trackers that gather the data from the websites/apps;
Data aggregators and brokers who aggregate and create
intimate knowledge that expose consumer vulnerabilities;
Ad networks that identify potential targets and place
manipulative content; and,
Consumer-facing websites and apps that lure potential
targets for manipulation.

Previous attempts to identify and regulate manipulation have
focused only on the actors—data collectors and manipulators—that
have a relationship with the target.230 Additional pressure on
consumer-facing firms is warranted but could lead to firms
outsourcing bad behavior to third parties that can operate outside
legal and market forces.231 Therefore, any policy to regulate targeted
manipulation needs to address each actor in its role and potential
divergent interest.
Third, data traffickers—those who collect, aggregate, and sell
consumer data—are the engine of the manipulation of online
consumers, yet they have no interaction, contract, or agreement with

229

Spencer, supra note 28, at 993. Spencer rightly points out the hurdles to
regulating manipulation to include problems with identification, identifying
causation and harm, and practical enforcement issues. See id.
230
For example, solutions that focus on a fiduciary duty because of an existing
relationship would not cover the work done by data aggregators, trackers, and ad
networks. Balkin, supra note 22, at 1183; Pozen & Khan, supra note 42, at 497;
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22, at 431.
231
E.g., Michael Burgess, Microsoft, Apple Reveal Anti-Slavery Measures in
Australia Law, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-12-21/microsoft-apple-suppliers-exposed-in-australia-anti-slavery-law
[https://perma.cc/5YZC-ZNDY].
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individuals.232 Similarly, the United States’ reliance on notice-andchoice fails to address targeted manipulation because most acts of
manipulation are done by market actors without a relationship with
the individual and without a legal need to notify or gain consent.233
B. Curtailing Manipulation Online
When manipulation is analyzed broadly, along with persuasion,
nudges, and dark patterns, identifying which acts are problematic
becomes difficult: “The fuzzy line between manipulation and
persuasion will pose the most significant challenge to any attempt
to regulate manipulation.”234 However, this Article has focused on
targeted manipulation as the covert leveraging of a specific target’s
vulnerabilities to steer their decisions towards the manipulator’s
interests. Thus, targeted manipulation is positioned here as a close
cousin to coercion and fraud in undermining authentic choice in the
market; the phenomenon of interest is much more narrow than
previous examinations of manipulation.235
In general, targeted manipulation can be governed by
diminishing any one of the key factors of manipulation identified
above: (1) aligning the interests of firms and individuals; (2)
protecting the vulnerabilities of consumers; and, (3) decreasing the
degree the tactic is hidden.236 Previous governance proposals have
232

As noted by Gu et al., “If data are considered the fuel of the digital economy,
‘data brokers’ are its catalyst.” Yiquan Gu, Leonardo Madio & Carlo Reggiani,
Data Brokers Co-Opetition, 1, 2 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 7523, 2021)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3343854, [https://perma.cc/
3NMH-QQGN]).
233
This limitation includes even the newer California law, called the California
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), because the law’s restrictions on selling to
third parties do not include trackers that collect data for data traffickers. See 1.81.5
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2018).
234
Spencer, supra note 28, at 985; see also Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable
Manipulation, supra note 32, at 469; Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra
note 8, at 1020.
235
Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 8, at 1020; Daniel Susser,
Beate Roessler, & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences
in a Digital World, supra note 15, at 2; Spencer, supra note 28, at 984.
236
Targeted manipulation is defined here as leveraging the vulnerabilities of
individuals in order to covertly steer a target’s decision towards the interests of
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focused on the second and third facets—protecting vulnerabilities
and decreasing the hiddenness of manipulation. These approaches
are important and are discussed in detail below. However, given the
economic abnormality of having an economic actor holding intimate
information about an individual, this Article spends more time
exploring how the interests of individuals can be aligned with those
firms that collect and use their individualized data—firms without
safeguards in place to align their interests with consumers, as
explored above in Part III.
1.

Aligning Interests
The majority of the work to manipulate goes on behind the
scenes where individuals have no influence, and their interests need
not be taken into account.237 Yet, “while regulators tend to focus
their efforts on primary data collectors, such as Facebook and
Google, it is often the secondary use of data that lacks transparency
and therefore harms the data subjects in uncontrollable ways.”238
This current approach to regulating manipulation—focusing on
consumer notification and choice—provides a shield for data
traffickers to collect and use individuals’ data without governance.239
Without any market pressures, data traffickers that hold intimate
knowledge of individuals should be held to a fiduciary-like standard
of care regarding how individuals’ data can be used. Accordingly,
data traffickers would be responsible for how their products and
services could be used to possibly undermine the interests of the
individuals. Professor Jack Balkin and others have called for
imposing fiduciary duties on firms that gather, aggregate, and use
the manipulator. The three facets correspond to the three components of the
definition. See supra note 36.
237
See infra Part II.B.2.
238
Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, supra note 32, at 486. See also
Hirsch, supra note 24, at 439.
239
Julie Cohen, The Inverse Relationship Between Secrecy and Privacy, 77
SOC. RSCH.: AN INT’L Q. 883, 886 (2010) (“Most reputable firms that deal directly
with consumers do disclose some information about their ‘privacy practices,’ but
the incentive is to formulate disclosures about both purposes and potential
recipients in the most general terms possible. This practice in turn shields
secondary recipients of personal data, many of whom do not disclose information
about their activities at all.”).
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individualized data,240 such as duties of care, confidentiality, and
loyalty,241 as well as discretion, honesty, and protection.242
However, attempts to add information fiduciary duties to online
firms have been criticized for relying on the relations of trust
between consumers and firms as a basis for the obligations of care
over data.243 This circumstance has placed scholars in a bind:
Relying on relationships of trust focuses on consumer-facing firms
that have some data but are not the major drivers of data trafficking
online. This reliance then leaves data traffickers with no obligations
or duties of care since there are no relationships with consumers.
Consumers are critical to most obligations of care and to fiduciary
relationships because a specific harm to a consumer is the trigger for
a violation, and the consumer is responsible for identifying the
violation.244 Yet, consumers are unaware of manipulation online.
This Article resolves these problems by placing a duty of care
on data traffickers that is independent of any harms and of any
consumer relationships. As such, internal and external auditors
would enforce the principles identified in this duty of care. Further,
this duty of care would hold all firms with individualized data to
data integrity principles. Such companies would be required to abide
by data integrity standards, similar to those of Generally Accepted
240

Ian Kerr began the discussion on imposing additional duties on service
providers based on their relationship with consumers. See Kerr, supra note 22, at
419. Richards and Hartzog have also consistently called for additional obligations
of loyalty on firms that have an informational relationship with consumers. See
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22, at
431; Richards & Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, supra note 22.
Balkin summarizes: “Because of their special power over others and their special
relationships to others, information fiduciaries have special duties to act in ways
that do not harm the interests of the people whose information they collect,
analyze, use, sell, and distribute.” Balkin, supra note 22, at 1186. This is similar
to Kilovaty’s focus on the fiduciary duties around security breaches. See Kilovaty,
Legally Cognizable Manipulation, supra note 32, at 457.
241
See Balkin, supra note 22, at 1234.
242
Balkin focuses on duties with online service providers, and Richard and
Hartzog call for confidentiality to extend to online relationships; Schatz’s Data
Care Act is similarly situated. See Balkin, supra note 22, at 1186; Richards &
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22, at 431.
243
Balkin, supra note 22, at 1186.
244
See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 817 (1983).
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Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), which are governed annually by
a team of auditors to ensure the companies’ actions are aligned with
the interests of consumers about whom they hold intimate data.245
Audits are useful to ensure companies are held to a professional
standard and therefore maintain the integrity of the industry when
consumers are not in a position to correct bad behavior in the
market.246 This recommendation shifts from focusing on consumers
to identify transgressions, which has been shown to be burdensome
or impossible given the information asymmetries,247 to requiring
internal and external governance to ensure these duties of care are
respected. This recommendation would be similar to financial and
accounting rules looking for insider trading and other SEC
violations, which do not require a harm to determine a violation or
penalty.248
A GAAP-like governance structure would be flexible enough to
understand market needs while still being responsive to protect
individual rights and concerns. And, the audit of those holding
individualized data would require the firm to record and document
how the firm uses that information, as well as mandate a
professional data scientist to run point on the audit. These measures
would pressure data aggregators to align their interests with those
individuals they are targeting. The justification for adding additional
safeguards to entities that hold dangerous products or place
individuals in vulnerable positions is well established. For example,
firms wishing to take investor money must be audited.249 Companies
involved in heavy manufacturing must abide by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations.250 Banks have
extensive reporting requirements, which were increased in the wake
245

William McGeveran calls for a GAAP-like approach for data security. See
William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1202
(2018). Here, one would have the same idea for data protection where standards
are set, and others must be certified to abide by them. See id.
246
See generally 85 F.R. 80508 (Dec. 11, 2020).
247
Alessandro Acquisti et al., Secrets and Likes: The Drive for Privacy and the
Difficulty of Achieving It in the Digital Age, 30 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 736, 746
(2020).
248
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.
249
See 12 C.F.R. § 363.
250
See 15 U.S.C. 2607(a).
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of the 2008 financial crisis.251 Insurance carriers are regulated at the
state level.252 In sum, certain industries that have been shown to put
individuals in vulnerable positions—where the market is unable to
adequately police bad business practices—take on additional
safeguards that are then continuously assessed by third parties,
including government agencies and auditors.
In addition, consumer-facing firms, such as websites and apps
who have a relationship with users, need to be responsible for the
third parties with whom they partner and make sure their consumers’
interests are respected and in alignment with all future uses of the
data. Hartzog and Richards argue that “[t]he most important
privacy-relevant relationships in the modern age are those between
data subjects and data collectors—between humans and the
companies that collect and process their information.”253 In fact,
calls for fiduciary duties are based on relationships of trust and
confidence with consumer-facing firms.254
Previously, the obligation of consumer-facing firms has focused
on how those consumer-facing firms used the data they collected.255
This Article extends the obligations identified by others to include
ensuring the third parties invited to track and target consumer-facing
251

Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/indexbsa.html [https://perma.cc/L4FW-6CND] (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
252
Commercial Insurance: Regulation, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/
publications/commercial-insurance/how-it-functions/regulation [https://perma.cc/
6KLX-GA2D] (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
253
Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and
the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1745 (2020).
254
Balkin, supra note 22, at 1223 (“By presenting themselves as trustworthy
collectors and keepers of our individual data, and by emphasizing that, for reasons
of security and competitiveness, they cannot be fully transparent, digital
organizations induce relations of trust from us, so that we will continue to use
their services.”).
255
For example, Professors Richards and Hartzog argue that firms have an
obligation of loyalty if: (1) trust is invited within an informational relationship;
(2) by a firm with power over an individual; (3) that has control over the
consumers mediated experiences; and, (4) where the weaker party (consumer)
relies on trust of that firm. Richards & Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy
Law, supra note 22, at 52. This duty of loyalty impacts what the firm can do with
the consumer’s information. Id.

518

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 3

firms’ users abide by the same duties of care and loyalty of the
consumer-facing firms. If the first proposal above is adopted,
consumer-facing firms would need to ensure all third parties pass
their audit and all third parties’ practices match the consumer-facing
firms’ obligations to their users. This obligation would prevent
consumer-facing firms from outsourcing bad data practices to third
parties.
Holding consumer-facing firms responsible for how their
partners (third-party trackers) gather and use their users’ data would
be similar to calls by Richards and Hartzog to extend confidentiality
of user information to new relationships (not only the consumerfacing website),256 or McGeveran’s call for collectors of consumer
data to ensure third parties abide by security standards.257 This duty
would force the consumer-facing firm—with whom the individual
has some influence—to make sure its users’ interests are respected
by the third-party trackers, ad networks, and marketers they invite
to track and target their users.258
Holding a company responsible for their third-party
relationships is not new. Professor McGeveran has called for
companies to be responsible for the security of their partners within
a duty of data custodians.259 McGeveran likens the duty of security
being extended to third parties to security rules under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) that
require a business to specify information security duties of their
partners.260 Similarly, payment card companies use contracts to
256

Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 22,
at 462.
257
McGeveran, supra note 245, at 1140.
258
It is ironic that, currently, data traffickers can sell data to bad actors but data
traffickers cannot have their data stolen by those same bad actors.
259
McGeveran, supra note 245, at 1140. The duties “impose a special duty on
these data custodians. They must dedicate systematic effort toward the
safekeeping of the personal information they hold.” Id.
260
HIPAA established a Security Rule that requires covered businesses to
“protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity” of information covered by the statute. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2019). This
Rule applies to health care providers and insurance companies, as well as any
“business associates” who process the protected data for other covered businesses.
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require all data custodians in their system to comply with industry
data security standards.261 Contracts like these, which impose
security obligations, are enforceable in court.262 Moreover, these
companies are uniquely positioned to know which third parties they
have allowed to track their users and are in the best position to
enforce a contract agreement making sure those third parties abide
by the above-mentioned duties of care.
In addition, consumer-facing websites and apps would be
similarly responsible for what third parties (such as ad networks and
marketers) are allowed to target their users with manipulative
content. The consumer-facing website and apps inherently know
and control which third parties use their infrastructure to target their
users. Similarly, banks are required to file Suspicious Activity
Reports to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network when they
suspect a third party is using their infrastructure for money
laundering or fraud.263 One can also look closer to home. Most
universities have extensive agreements managing the actions of
third-party recruiters invited onto campus to hire their students.264
Just as universities owe a duty of care to students when allowing
third parties on campus, websites and apps would likewise have a
duty of care to protect individuals from third parties whose interests
may not align with the users.265
Id. HIPAA further requires a covered business to specify the security duties of
their business associates in written contracts. See id.
261
McGeveran, supra note 245, at 1166.
262
Id. at 1175.
263
These financial institutions will monitor employees to check for insider
activity and will track customer transactions to check for evidence of money
laundering or fraud. What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, THOMSON REUTERS,
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/what-is-a-suspiciousactivity-report (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/B588-UVA8].
264
See, e.g., Recruiting and Offer Info, UNIV. MICH. CAREER CTR.,
https://careercenter.umich.edu/content/recruiting-and-offer-info (last visited Feb.
10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/54J4-4XNF] (“All employers utilizing our online
posting system, Handshake, for posting positions, on-campus interviews, and
other related recruitment activities will be asked to read and agree to
our Recruiting Policy below.”).
265
Trademark law provides another example of a company being responsible
for the questionable behavior of their third-party partners. A defendant can be
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Typically, consumer-facing firms act as a “honeypot” by luring
in consumers under the auspices of a trusting relationship only to
then allow third parties to track the users and sell their information
to data traffickers, and then later maintain user engagement for data
traffickers to manipulate a target covertly. Put this way, not enough
attention has been focused on the role of consumer-facing firms in
choosing the third parties that track and target their users. In fact,
focusing primarily on consumer-facing firms’ data practices allows
these firms to outsource their bad data practices to ungoverned third
parties operating outside the reach of market or regulatory forces.266
Importantly, this approach to align interests rather than limit the
use of data avoids two persistent problems in regulating information
flow online. First, attempts to limit the use of data run into First
Amendment critiques.267 If the flow of information is taken as a
given or legitimate, regulators have an uphill battle limiting what a
company can say (a type of “use”) with that data.268 Second,
designating a use as “unfair” usually relies on a discernable harm to
the consumer in order to trigger a regulation or law,269 such as the

indirectly liable for trademark infringement if the defendant: (1) “intentionally
induces another to infringe” or (2) “continues to supply its product to one whom
it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood
Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). Large service providers,
such as eBay, must have more than just general knowledge that its service is being
used to infringe, but the service provider cannot be willfully blind. Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1082
(2010). This principle would mean that ignoring the questionable behavior of
partners on purpose is not a legitimate defense.
266
The outsourcing of bad business practices has a long history. Garment and
manufacturing companies can outsource poor labor practices to other countries.
Outsourcing need not be to other countries; e.g., a manufacturer may build in a
non-union state to avoid union rules, or retailers may outsource cleaning staff and
maintain plausible deniability as to the poor labor practices.
267
Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (2014); Jane R.
Bambauer, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 16, 16 (2016).
268
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death
of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 855 (2011); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy
Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2015).
269
Calo, supra note 8, at 995.
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Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unfairness doctrine,270 the
unfairness protections of consumer protection laws,271 or even in a
recently proposed Data Protection Act.272 But the harms from
manipulation are not the kind normally identified by regulators, or
the harms are so dispersed as to be difficult to identify; and
therefore, the traditional triggers of data regulation fail to protect
consumers online.273 Accordingly, the approach proposed in this
Article does not rely on a consumer to identify a specific harm to
trigger an investigation into problematic use of data.274
2.

Protecting Vulnerabilities
Another mechanism to regulate manipulation is to limit firms’
collection and use of intimate knowledge, effectively protecting
consumers’ vulnerabilities. Manipulation is only possible because
someone—here, a data broker—has intimate information of
individuals and knows what renders them vulnerable in their
decision-making. A number of scholars have proposed greater
protections on specific types of data, such as intimate data,

270

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
272
Hirsch, supra note 24, at 439; Kilovaty, supra note 32, at 486; Woodrow
Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2235–36 (2015); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
583, 598–606 (2014); see Data Protection Act, S. 3300, 116th Cong. (2020).
273
Calo, supra note 8, at 995; Kilovaty, supra note 32, at 450.
274
Others leave open the idea that the FTC could regulate data practices based
on procedural issues, such as Citron and Pasquale. Citron & Pasquale, supra note
227, at 1. Hirsch sees the unfairness doctrine as requiring an “injury,” which, as
noted by Calo, does not usually cover the type of injury to the market described
herein—however, perhaps in the future. Hirsch, supra note 24, at 481 (“This
language creates a three-prong test. In order to exercise its unfairness authority
the FTC must first demonstrate that: (1) the business act or practice in question
causes ‘substantial injury to consumers’; (2) consumers themselves cannot
‘reasonably avoid[]’ this injury; and (3) the consumer injury that the business
practice creates is ‘not outweighed’ by its ‘benefits to consumers or to
competition.’”).
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inferences drawn from data,275 and sensitive information.276
Professor Dennis Hirsch broadens what could constitute
“vulnerable” in noting that surface information becomes
problematic through predictive analytics.277 Hirsch has advocated
for curtailing the collection of information at the source with the
idea that the consumer data that is not collected cannot also be used
against the consumers.278 Others have focused on limiting the use of
information once collected and have attempted to identify
problematic instances of use, such as unfair practices, unreasonable
self-dealing, and breaches of loyalty and confidentiality.279
3.

Eliminating Hiddenness
Another way to undermine the effectiveness of manipulation is
to make obvious and public the type of intimate knowledge used in
targeting, thereby eliminating the component of manipulation that
makes manipulation effective: hiddenness. Manipulation works
because the tactic is hidden from the target. However, notification
requirements are rarely an effective regulatory regime as companies
have no substantive requirements as to what their notifications must
entail. To be effective, a notice must be specific as to the
vulnerability being leveraged in a manipulative ad (e.g., “We placed
this ad because we think you are a gambler”). In addition, a registry
could serve as a notification to regulators and researchers as to the
type of information used to hyper-target users, whereby researchers
can retroactively identify the major factors used to target.
C. Specific Policy Suggestions Across Regulations
The suggested regulatory mechanisms above would entail a new
governance structure to ensure data traffickers safeguard
individualized data and align their interests with consumers. To
275
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277
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278
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 15, at 12.
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Online Consumer Transactions, 8 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 4–6 (2016).
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enforce new privacy regulations, some call for expanding the FTC’s
current scope of authority,280 while Professor Priscilla Regan calls
for a new regulatory agency within the U.S. Department of
Commerce.281
Nevertheless, across privacy regulations, the following steps can
be taken that would make targeted manipulation less likely. First,
regulations should explicitly recognize individual autonomy—
defined as the ability of individuals to be the authentic authors of
their own decisions—as a human right in order to protect individuals
from manipulation done in the name of “legitimate interests” within
the G20’s AI Principles and within the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation.282 For example, an individual has a right
to the restriction of information-processing dependent on the
legitimate grounds of the controller.283 Yet, “legitimate interests” are
broadly construed and the manipulation of individuals has not been
identified as diminishing a human right.284 One fix is to more clearly
link manipulation to individual autonomy, which would be seen as
a human right that could trump even the legitimate interests of data
traffickers.285
Second, all regulators should expand the types of information
requiring additional safeguards to protect users’ vulnerabilities from
being used for manipulation. Specifically, “inferences” should be
included as a type of protected data. The inferences made by data
traffickers based on a mosaic of information about individuals can
constitute intimate knowledge as to who is vulnerable and when.
Current approaches only include collected data as protected rather
280
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282
Council Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 and on the protection of natural persons with regard to
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) at
art. 14 (EU).
283
Id. at art. 14(2).
284
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
285
Zarsky rightly notes that threats to autonomy undermine at the level of the
individual and society. Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the
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Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 38–40 (2002).
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than the inferences drawn about individuals based on that collected
data.286
Finally, all regulations should expand the definition of “sold
data” to make sure all regulations include beacons and tracking
companies in the requirement to notify if user data is “sold.” The
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) has restrictions on
selling to third parties but does not include trackers who collect data
for data traffickers.287 Additionally, “the CCPA requires a business
to provide notice if it is ‘collect[ing] personal information collected
for additional purposes.’ This rule on its face does not stop
companies from using data for new purposes—it just requires
disclosure if they do so.”288 The approach to regulating manipulation
generally and within specific sectors would seek to diminish the key
facets of manipulation identified above: (1) aligning the interests of
firms and individuals; (2) protecting the vulnerabilities of
consumers; and, (3) decreasing the degree the tactic is hidden.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, this Article starts with the economic abnormality of
firms in the position to leverage individuals’ vulnerabilities to
manipulate consumers and then explores how firms gained the
power and knowledge to manipulate indiscriminately without
regulatory or market oversight. Firms in a position to leverage
aggregated consumer data is a symptom of the mistaken framing of
privacy-as-concealment in law, economics, and public policy.
Where scholarship has focused on identifying instances of
manipulation to regulate, this Article argues that firms merely in the
position to manipulate, with the intimate knowledge of the
individual and access to their decision-making, should be regulated
to ensure their interests are aligned with the target.
Governing targeted manipulation online will require additional
safeguards on those firms in a position to manipulate rather than
286
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287
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288
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attempting to identify each instance of targeted manipulation. First,
additional safeguards limiting data aggregators and ad networks—
specifically, any data trafficker without any relationship with
consumers—are needed to ensure the use of information is in the
interests of the consumer. Second, consumer-facing websites and
apps act as gatekeepers by luring in consumers to have their data
tracked by third parties and later targeting customers with
manipulative content. In so doing, consumer-facing companies
should be responsible for ensuring all third parties that access their
users—either for data collection or for targeting content—abide by
standards of care that are audited.

